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The question whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) will result in measurable economic benefits is of special policy relevance in 
particular given the European Union’s decision to require the application of IFRS 
by listed companies from 2005/2007. In this paper, I investigate the common con-
jecture that internationally recognized high quality reporting standards (IAS/IFRS 
or US-GAAP) reduce the cost of capital of adopting firms (e.g. Levitt 1998; IASB 
2002). Building on Leuz/Verrecchia (2000), I use a set of German firms which pre-
adopted such standards before 2005, but investigate the potential economic benefits 
by analyzing their expected cost of equity capital utilizing and customizing avail-
able implied estimation methods (e.g. Gebhardt/Lee/Swaminathan 2001, 
Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis 2002, Easton 2004). 
Evidence from a sample of about 13,000 HGB, 4,500 IAS/IFRS and 3,000   
US-GAAP firm-month observations in the period 1993-2002 generally fails to 
document lower expected cost of equity capital and therefore measurable economic 
benefits for firms applying IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP. Accordingly, I caution to state 
that reporting under internationally accepted standards, per se, lowers the cost of 
equity capital of adopting firms. 
 
 
JEL Classification: M41  1 
1.   Introduction 
 
The mandatory adoption of IFRS by listed companies in the European Union (EU) 
from 2005/2007 is an important step towards the evolution of global standards of 
accounting and shall ensure high quality and comparability across the EU countries 
(see Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002). The nature of potential economic benefits of 
that decision remains a subject of discussion, however. Regulators, financial 
statement preparers and users alike have commonly expressed the view that higher 
accounting quality and disclosure under internationally recognized standards such 
as IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP lower the cost of capital of adopting firms. The former 
SEC chairman Arthur Levitt once summarized this view by stating that “The truth 
is, high standards lower the cost of capital” (Levitt 1998). 
This view has traditionally been based on the theory that higher information quality 
either lowers the estimation risk of future returns (e.g. Clarkson/Guedes/Thompson 
1996) or that it lowers the information asymmetries between managers and outside 
investors, thus increases liquidity and ultimately lowers the required rates of return 
(e.g. Diamond/Verrecchia 1991). However, more recent analytical research has 
shown that this relationship does not hold under all conditions (Barth/Clinch/-
Shibano 1999). Further, empirical evidence on the association between disclosure 
and the cost of capital has produced mixed evidence so far, either measured within 
an accounting regime (e.g. Botosan 1997) or across different accounting regimes 
(Leuz/Verrecchia 2000, Leuz 2003). To summarize, it is neither theoretically nor 
empirically clear that international reporting per se lowers the cost of capital (Ewert 
1999). 
My study addresses this issue empirically by taking advantage of the recent 
transition process in Germany in which a considerable number of firms started to 
report their results under IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP instead of local financial 
reporting standards (HGB). For these firms, I measure the effect of this reporting 
strategy on their expected cost of equity capital. The German setting is particularly 
suitable for such an experiment as we have here worldwide the highest number of 
IFRS adopters as of today and the effects should be particularly strong given the the 
reputation of German accounting as one of the most discrete in the EU, if not 
worldwide.   2
Whereas Leuz/Verrecchia (2000) and Leuz (2003) examine bid/ask-spreads, trading 
volume and share price volatility as proxies for the information asymmetry 
component of the cost of equity capital, I extend the literature by estimating directly 
the expected cost of equity capital effects applying recent advances in accounting 
and finance in determining the cost of equity capital as an implied rate of return of a 
valuation model utilizing consensus earnings forecasts and share price. I employ 
both empirical implementations of the Residual Income Valuation model (RIV, 
Gebhardt/Lee/Swaminathan (GLS) 2001; Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis (ETSS) 
2002) and of the Capitalized Earnings model of Ohlson/Juettner-Nauroth (2000) 
(OJN, Gode/Mohanram 2002, Easton 2004). These can be considered the current 
“state-of-the-art” estimation methods and have specific complementing features 
(see Hail/Leuz 2003). 
I further extend these estimation procedures for the specific needs of research 
measuring the effect of a specific event, such as the switch in the reporting 
standards, on a firm’s required rates of return: First, I propose a method for monthly 
(instead of yearly) estimation which increases sample size and thus statistical power 
when using the RIV model (utilized in GLS 2001 and ETSS 2002). Second, I put 
forward bootstrapped sampling procedures in order to test for significant differences 
in the parameters when simultaneously estimating the expected cost of equity 
capital and the long-term growth rate of earnings in a regression framework for a 
portfolio of stocks before and after the event (utilized in ETSS 2002 and Easton 
2004). 
   
Applying this methodology to a set of around 75 switch- and 280 initial 
international reporting firms and a total sample size of about 13,000 HGB, 4,500 
IAS/IFRS and 3,000 US-GAAP firm-month observations in the period from 1993 to 
2002, I fail to document lower expected cost of equity capital for firms pre-adopting 
an international reporting strategy; this result holds equally for IAS/IFRS and for 
US-GAAP adopters. In cross-sectional regressions of the expected cost of equity 
capital estimates on reporting dummies (IAS/IFRS; US-GAAP) and on variables 
controlling for other risk factors (e.g. beta, size, book-to-market), the reporting 
dummies show to be insignificant whereas the relevant control variables generally 
show up to be significant in the hypothesized direction. Applying time-series 
analysis, I compare the absolute and relative risk premium for the switch 
companies’ one/two/three years before to after the switch “event” and find   3
statistically significant increases in the absolute risk premia, but insignificant 
changes in the relative risk premia after non-local GAAP adoption when controlling 
for the general market trend. When using simultaneous estimation methods (ETSS 
2002 and Easton 2004) combined with data-based simulation on the switch firms’ 
subset, I find again rising cost of equity capital post IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP 
adoption. Finally, when comparing over a period from 1997 to 2001 two portfolios 
of firms from similar industries measured yearly at the same points in time, but 
reporting under local versus under international standards, I find inconclusive 
results for the two portfolios. Accordingly, given these results based on a variety of 
different empirical tests showing either unchanged or even increasing cost of equity 
capital after international GAAP adoption, I would rather caution to state that 
international reporting, per se, lowers the cost of equity capital of adopting firms.  
In sum, my research contributes to the discussion of the potential economic 
consequences of introducing IFRS globally and in particular in the EU by 
2005/2007. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses 
potential economic consequences of introducing IFRS. Section 3 presents the 
research design, the data sample and finally my results utilizing the German setting. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.   Economic Consequences of Introducing IFRS 
 
The importance of IFRS is clearly documented in the most recent “GAAP 
convergence” survey in 2002 revealing that 95 percent of the 59 surveyed countries 
either have adopted intend to adopt, or intend to converge with IFRS for publicly 
traded companies.
1   In particular, the European Union (EU) requires listed 
companies to adopt IFRS by 2005/2007. This Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of 
July 2002 represents a most significant change in the nature and level of EU 
reporting requirements since the start of the EU accounting harmonization efforts 
and was labelled an accounting revolution (Wagenhofer 2003, p. 1). Given the size 
and importance of the EU capital markets, it is also considered a key step towards 
the evolution of a global set of accounting standards. 
                                                 
   
1 See GAAP Convergence (2002). See also IASB (2002a), p. 2 for a list of counties adopting IFRS 
around the world. The FASB and the IASB have a formal liaison relationship (“The Norwalk 
Agreement”) and a short-term convergence project on their agendas. See IASB (2002b), p. 1.   4
The nature of economic benefits and costs of adopting IFRS within and across 
countries remains a subject of discussion, however (see Pownell/Schipper (1999) 
and Schipper (2000) for a discussion). Still, a benefit versus cost analysis is key 
when assessing the quality of accounting standards and when rationalizing IFRS in 
favour of local standards customized according to the needs of a particular financial 
system.
2 While the direct cost of adopting IFRS in the firm’s accounting systems 
have been estimated by adopting firms and/or their consultants in applied business 
journals
3, the total economic costs
4 and particularly benefits are even more difficult 
to quantify.
5  The increased transparency and quality as compared to most local 
reporting requirements as well as the perceived increased comparability of financial 
reports under IFRS across countries and markets should make it less difficult and 
costly for investors to compare the opportunities and risk involved in investments in 
global markets. While these are not ends in themselves, transparency and 
comparability should ultimately result in lower rates of return investors require for 
providing funds and thus in lower cost of capital for adopting firms. 
Decreasing cost of capital as an underlying rationale has often been expressed by 
the IASB
6, regulators around the globe adopting IFRS
7, and has also been put 
forward to reason the EU’s decision. For example, Fritz Bolkestein, the European 
Commissioner for Internal Markets, assessed that IFRS are “vital because a single 
set of accounting standards will help reduce the cost of capital”.
8 Straighter to the 
point, Arthur Levitt, the former SEC Chairman, once summarized “The truth is, 
high quality standards lower the cost of capital”.
9 The motivation and claim that 
international reporting standards are expected to lower the adopter’s cost of capital 
nowadays are commonly found in the media and applied business journals
10 and is 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the AAA’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee (1998), also Gebhardt 
(2000). 
3 See, for example, Köhler/Marten/Schlereth/Crampton (2003), pp. 2619-2620. 
4 In addition to the direct cost of transforming a firm’s accounting system, there can be further 
indirect such as proprietary cost. For a discussion, see, for example, Breker/Naumann/Tielmann 
(1999), p. 148. 
5 See, for example, Ballwieser, W., “Rechnungslegung im Umbruch”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, March 3, 2004. 
6 See IASB (2002a), p. 6. 
7 See, for example, the Australian Financial Reporting Council, on: 
http://www.frc.gov.au/content/info_paper.asp. 
8 Quoted from Bolkestein, F. “One currency, one accounting standard: Unless the European Union 
adopts a single set of rules, it risks losing the benefits of the euro”, Financial Times, June 14, 2000. 
9 Quoted from Levitt (1998), p. 82. 
   
10 See, for example, Schindler, J./Schurbohm, A., “Mit IAS das babylonische Sprachengewirr 
beenden”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 9, 2001.   5
frequently referred to by the involved parties in Europe, particularly in countries 
where companies have already adopted international reporting. This thought equally 




Academic research, however, has found it difficult to document systematically the 
perceived benefits and the accomplishments of the declared objectives of 
introducing IFRS when using data of firm’s which already have adopted some form 
of international reporting (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP). While some studies have 
focused on the intermediate goals of achieving comparability (Chen/Sun/Wang 
2002) or increased transparency and accounting quality (Ball/Robin/Wu 2003), 
research trying to estimate the effects on the ultimate goal of achieving measurable 
economic benefits in form of a reduction of the firm’s cost of capital is still scarce 
(Leuz/Verrecchia 2000, Leuz 2003). 
 
2.1.  Financial Reporting, Information Quality and the Cost of Capital 
 
There are two key premises which establish a connection between the adoption of 
international reports and a reduction in firm’s cost of capital: First, financial 
reporting under IFRS and/or US-GAAP must lead to higher information quality as 
compared to local GAAP. Second, higher information quality must ultimately effect 
and reduce a firm’s cost of capital. 
The claim of higher information quality of IFRS and US-GAAP as compared to 
accounting regimes outside the “Anglo-Saxon” sphere is based on the higher 
quantity of required disclosures as well as the supposed higher information content 
of their accounting numbers. Within the EU, this specifically applies to the 
Continental European countries with a French or German accounting origin which 
have been criticised as too discrete and too heavily influenced by tax avoidance 
strategies (see Leuz/Verrecchia 2000). 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Pellens/Tomaszeweski (1999), p. 201-203, Stahl (2002), p. 34. 
12 See, for example, Marten/Schlereth/Crampton/Köhler (2002), p. 2010. This survey was conducted 
with the German Association of Security Analysts (DVFA Deutsche Vereinigung für Finanzanalyse 
und Asset Management). 
   
13 See Breker/Naumann/Tielmann (1999), p. 145 from the German Association of Chartered 
Accountants (IDW Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer) or Illingworth (2003) for the Institut of Chartered 
Accountants in England & Wales.   6
That both IFRS and US-GAAP require higher levels of disclosure than local 
regulations in these Continental European countries can be considered generally 
accepted.
14 This understanding equally applies today to the business community
15 
and regulators
16   as academic studies have largely supported this view when 
comparing disclosure rules of these different reporting standards as well as actual 
disclosures in annual reports of companies applying either local GAAP, IAS/IFRS 
or US-GAAP.
17   But IFRS and US-GAAP have not only added disclosure 
requirements, they also have different recognition and measurement rules affecting 
the accounting numbers. Whether these rules possess higher information quality, 
however, is still subject to intense discussions in the EU.
18 For example, the French 
President Jacque Chirac has recently questioned the quality of IFRS.
19 Empirically, 
the vast majority of studies applying a variety of empirical experiments support the 
notion that US-GAAP have higher information quality in their earnings than 
Continental European accounting regimes.
20 Since IAS/IFRS figures empirically are 
documented to be closer to US-GAAP than any other accounting regime (e.g. 
Harris/Muller 1999), similar better-quality properties are predicted. 
Whether IFRS or US-GAAP, “the two leading contenders in the global competition 
among financial reporting regimes” (Leuz 2003, p. 446), are really of comparable 
information quality or whether US-GAAP is superior to IFRS is another 
controversy.
21 While proponents of IFRS argue that their quality have improved 
substantially over time especially with the completion of the 
Comparability/Improvement Project, are now relatively close to US-GAAP with 
only minor differences remaining and give sufficient disclosures which allow 
                                                 
14 Note however, that although former studies in the field assume that higher information quantity 
also increases information quality that does not necessarily has to be the case. See Botosan/Plumlee 
(2002) or Schrand/Verrecchia (2002). 
15 For example in Germany, 89% of the surveyed financial analysts in 
Köhler/Marten/Schlereth/Crampton (2002), p. 2008 and 84% of the surveyed company 
representatives in Köhler/Marten/Schlereth/Crampton (2003), p. 2616, agree that IFRS or US-GAAP 
have higher transparency and a higher quantity of disclosure than local HGB standards. 
16 See, for example, Van Hulle (2003). 
17 See, for example, Ballwieser (1997). For detailed comparision, Born (2002); Hayn/Graf Waldersee 
(2002). Note that this result is documented despite the finding that many firms do not fully comply 
with all disclosure rules. See Glaum/Street (2002) or Gebhardt/Heilmann (2004). 
18 See, for example, Schildbach (2004) for questioning IFRS in the Continental European 
institutional setting. 
19 See, for example, AccountancyAge.com, “Poor old Jacque Chirac”, www.accountancyAge.com, 
July 31, 2003. 
20 These include value relevance studies (e.g. Harris/Lang/Möller 1994) or timeliness and 
conservatism studies (e.g. Ball/Kothari/Robin 2000).  
   
21 For similarities and differences between IFRS and US-GAAP, see The IASC-U.S. Comparison 
Project (1999).   7
investors to draw their own conclusion in case of divergence, IFRS opponents argue 
that still material differences between the two standards remain and US-GAAP are 
still better-quality since IFRS are less detailed, allow higher flexibility and require 
fewer disclosures (see Leuz 2003 for an in-depth discussion). Empirically, however, 
the few studies available generally do not support the claims that US-GAAP 
produce financial statements of higher information quality. Although Harris/Muller 
(1999) do find that US-GAAP are incrementally value relevant to IAS when 
examining Form 20-F reconciliations to US-GAAP, Ashbaugh/Olssen (2002) find 
similar value relevance for IAS and US-GAAP when looking at a sample of non-US 
firms listed on London’s SEAQ. On top, taking quality one step further and 
analyzing potential different economic consequences, Leuz (2003) finds statistically 
insignificant and only economically small differences in bid-ask spread and share 
turnover between IAS and US-GAAP adopting firms at Germany’s former New 
Market. 
This result would also be consistent with an alternative view that rather than by the 
reporting standards, accounting quality is predominately determined by a firm’s 
reporting incentives created by its institutional environment and market forces 
(Leuz/Nanda/Wysocki 2003, Ball/Robin/Wu 2003). Applied to the EU case and 
given the similar reporting incentives preparers face after adopting IFRS or US-
GAAP, this view would expect similar accounting quality within a country 
irrespectively of the reporting regime applied (local GAAP, IFRS or US-GAAP). 
Despite these concerns, it can still be considered the predominant view that IFRS 
and/or US-GAAP being customized towards the needs of outside investors have 
higher information quality for public capital markets than most local regimes as it 
forms the basis for the increasing acceptance or adoption of IFRS globally. Whether 
higher information quality, however, ultimately effects and decreases the cost of 
capital is yet another question. Although there is no role for such additional 
information in the CAPM context, three main streams of analytical research have 
provided possible explanations based on either liquidity risk, estimation risk or 
misalignment risk in investment decisions. 
The first stream links information quality and cost of capital through the effects of 
voluntary disclosure on a stock’s liquidity (see Verrecchia 2001 for a survey). In 
these models, less-informed investors may be forced to trade with better-informed 
     8
market participants in case of future liquidity shocks. These information 
asymmetries introduce adverse selection into stock transactions and hence reduce 
market liquidity. Thus, in order to motivate unwilling potential investors to acquire 
shares in illiquid markets, firms must issue their shares at a discount, which results 
in fewer funds raised and hence higher cost of capital. A firm’s commitment to 
increased disclosure which turns private into public information, in turn, reduces 
information asymmetries among market participants, increases liquidity, and hence 
reduces the cost of capital (see Diamond/Verrecchia 1991, Baiman/Verrecchia 
1996). This disclosure effect, however, is not as clear when incorporating a third 
party of rational investors which individually decide whether to acquire private 
information or not. When based on more precise financial statement information 
these investors’ cost of getting informed decrease more than their benefits for such 
activity decline, this “expertise acquisition” effect may result in even more private 
information acquisition, thus less liquidity and higher cost of capital in case it 
overcompensates the basic “direct GAAP” effect (Barth/Clinch/Shibano 1999). In 
sum, under these types of models, the final effect largely depends on the 
constellations of the model parameters and remains an empirical question (Ewert 
1999). Still, the effect of decreasing cost of capital when public disclosure mitigates 
private information is more recently underlined by Easley/O’Hara (2004) using a 
different type multi-assets rational expectations model. 
The second stream of theoretical research claims that higher information quality 
lowers a firm’s cost of capital by reducing nondiversifiable estimation risk. As 
investors have to estimate the parameters of a security’s return or its payoff-
distribution based on available information when forming an optimal portfolio, they 
face estimation risk in addition to the systematic risk they bear (e.g. Coles/-
Loewenstein/Suay 1995). Additional information can reduce estimation risk and 
thus will be rewarded by risk-averse investors. However, as there is much 
discussion about the diversibility and pricing of such estimation risk when 
aggregating across firms in a portfolio (Clarkson/Guedes/Thompson 1996), its 
validity remains largely an empirical question. 
   
The last and most recent stream probably provides the most direct theoretical link 
between the quality of information in financial statements and the cost of capital. 
Leuz/Verrecchia (2004) present a capital market model with rational expectations in 
which better information improves the coordination between firms and outside   9
investors regarding a firm’s investment decisions and thus reduces misalignment 
risk between the two parties. In this scenario, higher information quality affects not 
only investors’ perception of a firm’s future cash flows, but instead market 
participants are also better enabled to affect the firm’s real decisions and future cash 
flows. Anticipating this effect, investors will consequently require a lower risk 
premium for high-quality reporting firms, even when aggregating across firms in a 
portfolio. 
Empirical research has tested these theoretical predictions by analysing the 
relationship between information quality of financial statements, measured both 
within and across GAAP regimes, and a firm’s cost of capital, estimated either 
directly or by using related proxies. 
When measuring different levels of information quality within a GAAP regime, one 
line of investigation documents that higher voluntary disclosure can lead to a 
reduction in a firm’s cost of equity capital (Botosan 1997, Hail 2002) and cost of 
public debt (Sengupta 1998). However, this evidence is rather weak and highly 
depends on research specification (Botosan/Plumlee 2002). The second area shows 
in addition that firms with certain desirable properties of earnings which increase 
information quality exhibit empirically lower expected cost of equity capital 
(Francis/LaFond/Olsson/Schipper 2003). 
When analyzing the impact of different information quality across GAAP regimes 
on a firm’s cost of capital, a switch from local financial reporting to IAS/IFRS 
and/or US-GAAP can be seen as an even stronger signal of increasing information 
quality rather than voluntary disclosure or certain earnings attributes within one 
accounting regime which is reversible by managerial discretion in the future. An 
international reporting strategy, instead, represents a credible commitment to 
increased public investor orientation. That is because although, for example, IFRS 
adoption is voluntary in the EU before 2005, the higher disclosure rules under IFRS 
are mandatory once a firm has committed itself and IFRS implementation is 
difficult to reverse given the material costs of transition (see Leuz/Verrecchia 2000). 
The perceived more informative earnings attributes under IFRS and/or US-GAAP 
come on top of the disclosure explanation. Further, the theoretical setting of 
reducing private information in the market by more public disclosures is 
particularly appealing to the Continental European case. Here, given historically 
     10
concentrated ownership structures and reliance on private debt financing, the 
financial accounting standards have evolved to be rather uninformative for outside 
investors, but instead have reasonably well informed key financing and contracting 
parties by communicating private information (see Leuz/Wüstemann 2003). The 
switch to Anglo-American standards customized towards the needs of outside 
investors which Continental European firms increasingly try to attract under 
globalization pressures can thus be considered a key example for exchanging 
private for public information. 
Despite this theoretical background and the popular claim that IAS/IFRS or US-
GAAP adoption reduces a firm’s cost of capital, there is surprisingly little 
supporting empirical evidence. Prior evidence is rather small sample based and 
none has applied the same research methodology as the within GAAP studies (See 
Joos 2000, p. 133). When looking at the market effects of the announcement to 
adopt IFRS or US-GAAP, Pellens/Tomaszewski (1999) document insignificant 
average stock price reactions to the announcement of the first eight IAS and six US-
GAAP adopters in Germany. Similarly, Comprix/Muller/Stanford-Harris (2002) 
find only weakly significant but negative average stock price reactions of EU firms 
to the announcement of the European Commission to require IFRS in the EU for 
listed companies from 2005/2007. Further, Auer (1998) examines changes in beta 
and share price volatility for a sample of seventeen Swiss firms that have switched 
very early to IAS in the period from 1988 to 1993 and thus well before the 
completion of the Comparability/Improvement Project. He finds no significant 
changes in beta factor or share price volatility for these early adopters. Finally, 
Leuz/Verrecchia (2000) examine for a set of fourteen IAS and seven US-GAAP 
adopters in Germany bid-ask spread, trading volume and share price volatility as 
proxies for the information asymmetry component of their cost of capital. They find 
consistently lower bid-ask spreads and higher share turnover, but no reduction in 
share price volatility for firms using IAS or US-GAAP as compared to firms 
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2.2.  The Process of Transition towards IFRS 
 
Globalization and the integration of capital markets around the world have 
increased the demand among investors for a universal set of reporting standards in 
the past decade (see McKinsey 2002).
22 The International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) founded in 1973 aims at providing such a “single set of high 
quality, understandable and enforceable global accounting standards”.
23 After being 
criticized for its early standards, the IASC considerably decreased the number of 
accounting alternatives in its Comparability/Improvements Project from 1987 to 
1995 and further shaped its standards afterwards in the process of seeking 
endorsement of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
After successful completion, IOSCO has recommended its members from 2000 to 
permit firms preparing their financial statements according to IASC core standards 
for cross-border offerings and listings.
24 Today, major stock exchanges around the 
world accept IFRS (e.g. London, Tokyo or Frankfurt) – the U.S. exchanges being 
the most important exception. 
The rising acceptance of IFRS globally has particularly been boosted by the EU. 
After failure of its mutual recognition strategy with the U.S. and unsuccessful 
attempts to improve its own reporting requirements set forth in the 4
th and 7
th 
Directives, the European Commission implemented in 1995 a new strategy 
supporting IASC standards.
25 This policy finally lead in July 2002 to Regulation 
(EC) No 1606/2002 requiring from all EU publicly traded companies to adopt IFRS 
by 2005 (with some exceptions by 2007) and in September 2003 to Regulation (EC) 
No 1725/2003 endorsing all standards (IASs) and interpretations (SICs) in EU law 
except IAS 32 and IAS 39 and related interpretations.
26 In consequence, this policy 
implies that around 7,000 listed EU companies
27 will have to report their results 
                                                 
22 In their “Global Investor Opinion on Corporate Governance” survey in 2002, 90% of the 
interviewed 200 institutional investors favored a single set of global accounting standards. 
23 See IASC Foundation Constitution (2002), PART A, No. 2. 
24 See IOSCO Press Release “IASC Standards” on May 17, 2000. 
25 See EU COM (95) 508 (1995). 
26 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/accounting/ias_en.htm and Wagenhofer (2003), 
pp. 26-34. 
   
27 See Federation of European Securities Exchanges; 
http://www.fese.be/statistics/monthly_statistics/tables/table4.htm.   12
under IFRS from 2005/2007. It has also inspired other standard setters to consider 
IFRS alike.
28 
In some EU member countries,
29 the process towards adoption of internationally 
recognized standards started well before the EU Regulations and was initiated by 
multinational corporations trying to attract foreign capital.
30 In 1993, Daimler-Benz 
reconciled in Form-20F to US-GAAP after seeking listing on NYSE
31 and Puma 
presented a full second set of financial statements under IAS. After Daimler-Benz 
had “broken the ice” (Wagenhofer 2003, p. 2), more and more companies started to 
adopt voluntarily either IAS or US-GAAP in the following years under different 
strategies which satisfied the still existing requirement to prepare consolidated 
financial statements in accordance with German GAAP.
32 
In April 1998, the German legislator finally reacted with the KapAEG law to these 
“revolutionary”
33 and “unexpectedly rapid”
34 developments and introduced § 292a 
HGB allowing listed German parent companies to prepare their consolidated 
financial statement solely under unspecified  international accepted accounting 
standards
35   for a transitional period expiring by December 31, 2004.
36  The 
introduction of § 292a HGB resulted in a sharp increase in the number of companies 
adopting IAS or US-GAAP. By 1999, the number of firms reporting according to 
international standards already rose above 50 percent in the group of the 100 DAX-
firms.
37 
In addition, the German Stock exchange Deutsche Börse launched in March 1997 
the New Market, a stock market segment particularly for innovative and fast-
growing industries. Given the large uncertainty about a firm’s business prospects, 
the listing regulations explicitly required financial statements to be prepared 
                                                 
28 See IASB (2002c): “Other justisdictions move towards IFRSs”. These are, e.g., Australia, Canada, 
Russia. 
29 See Leuz/Wüstemann (2003) for a summarizing survey on the role of accounting in the German 
financial system. 
30 See Gebhardt (2000) and Busse von Colbe (2002) for summaries of this process. 
31 See Radebaugh/Gebhardt/Gray (1995) for an in-depth discussion. 
32 See Leuz/Verrecchia (2000) for a summary of the early adoption practices which included: (1) 
reconciliations to income and shareholders’ equity under IAS or US-GAAP (2) dual reporting under 
which firms produced one set of financial statements as close as possible to IAS or US-GAAP 
without violating HGB (3) parallel reporting under which companies disclosed two full sets of 
financial statements, one under local GAAP and another under IAS or US-GAAP. 
33 See Busse von Colbe (1995). 
34 See Kleekämper (1995). 
35 Such standards are IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP, see DRS 1.10-13. 
36 Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz – KapAEG, BGBI, April 24, 1998. 
   
37 See Spanheimer (2002), p. 216.   13
according to IAS or US-GAAP.
38 After an enormous early success, however, firms 
listed on the New Market were reassigned in 2003 to two new market segments, the 
Prime Standard and the General Standard. The requirement to prepare 
internationally accepted standards now applies only to the Prime Standard.
39 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 summarizes these developments towards internationalization of financial 
reporting in Germany. The yearly number and percentages of firms reporting under 
HGB, IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP are presented for my sample which very well 
reflects the entire population. The German setting represents the ideal field for an 
experiment testing the common conjectures and theoretical predictions that 
adopting International reporting (IAS/IFRS and/or US-GAAP) lowers a firm’s cost 
of capital as not only the number of available firms applying IAS/IFRS are higher 
than in any other country worldwide as of today,
40 but also as the effect of reducing 
asymmetric information and thus on a firm’s cost of capital should be particularly 
high here given Germany’s local accounting regimes’ reputation of being among 
the most discrete in the EU, if not worldwide. 
 
3. Empirical  Analysis 
 
3.1.  Estimating the Expected Cost of Equity Capital 
 
While the literature in accounting, finance and economics has suggested a wide 
range of estimation procedures for the measurement of a firm’s cost of equity 
capital, traditional state of the art methods, such as the CAPM or the Fama/French 
Three-Factor-Model not only have produced disappointing results empirically 
(Fama/French 1997; 2003), they also are questionable in that they use average 
                                                 
38 See Leuz (2003), pp. 450-452 for a detailed description of the New Market in Germany. 
39 See Exchange Rules for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange § 62 (1). 
40 In 2003, the majority of IFRS adopters globally (56%) are based in the three German accounting 
origin countries Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The remaining 44% IFRS adopters are spread 
over 37 other countries around the world according to the list provided by the IASB, on: 
www.iasc.or.uk/cmt, September 26, 2003. 
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realized returns instead of measures of expected returns for which the underlying 
theories on asset pricing call for (Elton 1999). 
An alternative approach has been proposed that does not rely on realized returns 
and instead applies forward-looking data (see Botosan 1997, GLS 2001). The 
underlying idea is to use a model of corporate valuation to generate a market 
implied cost of equity capital, defined as the internal rate of return that equates the 
current stock price to the present value of the market’s expected future residual 
flows to common shareholders as approximated by observable consensus analyst 
forecasts. In equilibrium, the same information is reflected in the stock price on the 
left side and in the consensus forecasts on the right side of the equation. 
Accordingly this internal rate of return reflects the cost of equity that the market 
applies to expected future cash flows (Mehra 2002). This approach is not only 
conceptually appealing and has been used by other current studies in this field,
41 it 
also bypasses further issues in the traditional methods in my context. Specifically, 
the CAPM provides no role for accounting standards on the one hand,
42 but book-
to-market as one important risk factor in the Fama/French Three-Factor-Model is 
certainly influenced by the accounting standards applied, however without priors of 
the effect on the factors’ risk premia, on the other. 
 
3.1.1. Model  Selection 
 
Based on the same theoretical foundation, all models of corporate valuation lead to 
identical results under consistent assumptions. However, for practical reasons 
earnings based valuation appears to be the most reasonable to implement when 
estimating an implied cost of capital. In several studies evaluating the models’ 
ability to explain cross-sectional stock prices, the residual income model (RIV) has 
shown to have higher accuracy empirically than cash flow-oriented methods (DDM, 
DCF).
43   Further, earnings forecasts by analysts are available in I/B/E/S for 
international data since 1987, whereas cash flow and dividend forecasts have 
become available only very recently.
44  
                                                 
41 See, for example, Richardson/Welker (2001), Botosan/Plumlee (2002), Hail/Leuz (2003). 
42 See Botosan (1997), Easley/O’Hara (2004). 
43 See Penman/Sougiannis (1998), Frankel/Lee (1998), Francis/Olsson/Oswald (2000). 
   
44 See Thomson Financial (2003).   15
Two concepts for earnings based estimations have been suggested in the related 
literature, residual income valuation (RIV) and capitalized expected earnings after 
Ohlson/Juettner-Nauroth (2000) (OJN). Both have their unique advantages and 
disadvantages: Whereas in RIV the central assumption of clean-surplus accounting 
can be violated on a per share basis (Ohlson 2000), such violations have no effect 
on the OJN valuation (Ohlson/Juettner-Nauroth 2000). RIV can cope with any 
earnings forecast, whereas cost of capital estimations building on OJN are restricted 
to subgroups of firms with positive earnings forecasts only (see Easton 2004). Since 
research on the relative ability of the two approaches to explain cross-sectional 
variation in future stock returns has only started (see Guay/Kothari/Shu 2003, 
Easton/Monahan 2003), I utilize both concepts in line with Hail/Leuz (2003). Given 
that the valuation models’ estimates have shown to be particularly sensitive to the 
choice of the long-term future growth rate in terminal value calculation, I further 
utilize two estimation approaches for each model: The first uses economically 
plausible assumptions about future growth and can be applied to a single firm (GLS 
2001; Gode/Mohanram 2002), while the second simultaneously estimates the 
expected cost of equity capital and the long-term growth rate in a portfolio, but can 
only be applied to a set of firms (ETSS 2002, Easton 2004). In addition, I adjust the 
RIV methods for monthly estimation (Daske/Gebhardt/Klein 2004) as described in 
the next section. 
 
3.1.2. Estimation  Procedures 
 
Most previous studies calculate the expected rate of return only once a year at a 
specific predetermined date (e.g. June 30/December 31/ten month after a firm’s 
fiscal year’s end)
 45. I estimate the expected cost of equity capital monthly as 
I/B/E/S updates its consensus forecasts once each month (at the third Thursday).
46 
Further, I require that all information necessary to calculate the expected cost of 
equity capital is available to market participants at the time
47 and that the input 
                                                 
45 See GLS (2001), p. 145; Gode/Mohanram (2002), p. 15 (in June), ETSS (2002), p. 664; Easton 
(2004), pp. 19-20 (in December), Hail/Leuz (2003), p. 5 (ten month after a firm’s fiscal year’s end). 
46 Similarly, Lee/Myers (1999) also estimate the intrinsic value of a firm monthly using a RIV 
model. 
   
47 ETSS (2002) perform their estimation for December 31 and use book value of equity, although 
this number becomes available (even to insiders) only later in the next fiscal year.   16




3.1.2.1. Assuming Long-Term Growth 
 
The expected cost of equity capital can be estimated for each individual firm at 
every monthly estimation date in case a long-term growth rate is assumed.  
 
Residual Income Valuation (RIV) 
My RIV estimation method assuming long-term growth is a modification of the 
approach by GLS (2001) in which the infinite forecast horizon is divided into three 





















)) ( , (
1
365
)) 1 ( , (
365





















year date estimation days
RIV
t





































(a) Explicit forecast 
      period 
(c) Terminal value 
(b) Fading period 
 
 
                                                 
   
48 Variables used in a RIV framework in former studies often reflect information at different points 
in time. For example, Claus/Thomas (2001) use share prices and book values of equity as of 
December 31
st, but forecasts as of April 30
th of the following year. This implies that information 
flows into the estimation as of December 31
st which will be available only at the end of April.   17
where:  E(.)  =  Expectation based on information available at time t 
 p t  =  Price per share at time t 
 bvpst  =  Book value per share at time t 
  feps’t  =  Forecasted earnings per share for the time between the 
estimation date t and the next fiscal year’s end 
  fepst  =  Forecasted earnings per share at time t 
  FROEt  =  Forecasted return on equity at time t 
  RIt  =  Residual income per share at time t 
  days  =  Number of days between estimation date and fiscal year’s end 
n 
  r
RIV  =  Cost of equity capital under RIV. 
   
 
(a) The explicit forecast period covers the next five financial years of detailed 
analyst consensus earnings forecasts, the maximum future period for which 
historical data is potentially available in I/B/E/S. The “consensus” earnings 
estimates are calculated as median EPS-forecast of all individual analysts. I require 
consensus earnings forecast at least for the next three financial years following the 
estimation date. In case there are less than five future years of forecast data, but 
(instead) a consensus estimate of the long-term growth rate of earnings applying to 
the period from the last detailed EPS-forecast until year five, I estimate the missing 
forecasts for years plus four and/or plus five as  ( )
IBES
t t g feps feps + = + 1 1 . If the 
consensus growth rate is not available, I approximate these forecasts by applying an 
artificial growth rate of earnings implicit in the available previous period forecasts 

















+ =  
where:  fepst  =  Forecasted earnings per share at time t 
 
Under the assumptions that clean-surplus accounting holds in expectations, earnings 
forecasts, the assumption of a constant dividend payout-ratio and current book value 
of equity allow to calculate expected future book values of equity and finally the 
expected residual income for the next five future periods starting from the 
estimation date:  
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(3)    () ( 1 − × − = n t
RIV
n n t bvps E r feps RI E )
                                                
  Et[RIn]  =  Expected residual income per share for period n at time t 
  Et[bvpsn]  =  Expected book value per share in period n 
 Fepsn  =  Forecasted earnings per share for period n at time t 
  r
RIV  =  Cost of equity capital under RIV. 
 
(b) During the fading period, forecasted earnings are calculated by multiplying the 
return on equity (ROE), defined as the ratio of earnings at this fiscal year’s end and 
the book value of equity of last fiscal year’s end. Starting from the ROE at the end 
of explicit forecast period 5, the ROE is then assumed to fade straight-line in the 
following years to the expected target-ROE of the industry in period 12. 
Accordingly, expected earnings are calculated for fiscal years 6 to 12 as: 
 
(4)    1 − × = n n n bvps FROE feps
where:  fepsn  =  Forecasted earnings per share at the end of period n  
 FROEn  =  Forecasted book return on equity at the end of period n 
  bvpsn-1  =  Book value per share at the end of period n-1 
 
 
This method implies that no individual firm is able to earn abnormal profits beyond 
a certain period of time due to the dynamics of market competition and will be 
tending towards their industry peers. Absent a data-base which collects analyst 
expectations beyond period 5, I determine the target-ROE of the various industries 
as in GLS (2001).
49  
(c) The terminal value for year 12 is finally estimated by computing the present 




In order to match the input variables reflecting only information available to the 
market at the estimation date, I adjust the accounting data referring to the fiscal 
 
49 All firms are grouped into the various industry peers as in Fama/French (1997) and then the 
median ROE’s over the past 5 years are calculated for each group as proxy for expected ROE. 
Certainly, industry ROE’s are affected by the (changing) accounting rules of the firms analyzed in 
the industry. It is a priori difficult to judge how they are affected and how a potential bias could be 
corrected. See Easton/Taylor/Shroff (2001) for general deficiencies of the target ROE. 
   
50 This implies that any growth in earnings after year 12 is value neutral, see GLS (2001), p. 142. 
Alternatively, other studies assume a moderate growth rate of residual income, see Claus/Thomas 
(2001), p. 1636.   19
year’s end dates (book value of equity, earnings forecasts) as in 
Daske/Gebhardt/Klein (2004). I compute a book value of equity under the 
assumption that book value of equity is growing steadily over the fiscal year at each 
monthly estimation date A (bvpsA) at which I/B/E/S consensus forecasts are 
renewed. Using this assumption, I calculate the bvpsA as: 
  
 (5)  365
)) 1 ( , (
1 0 ) 1 (
year date estimation days
A FROE bvps bvps + × =  
where:  A =  Estimation date 
 bvpsA  =  Book value per share at the estimation date A 
  bvps0  =  Book value per share at the previous fiscal year’s end date 0 
  FROE1  =  Forecasted book return on equity for the next fiscal year 
 
Into this calculation flows the expected ROE for the financial year which is used to 
calculate the interest compound up to that estimation date A. The expected ROE 
applied is calculated by using the most recent explicit analyst consensus earnings 







FROE =  
where:  FROE1  =  Forecasted book return on equity for the following fiscal year 
 feps1  =  Forecasted earnings per share for the next fiscal year 
  bvps0  =  Book value per share at the previous fiscal year’s end date 0 
  
 
Adding compound interest to last fiscal year’s book value of equity (bvps0) is a 
proxy for earnings realized from last fiscal year’s end up to the estimation date A. 
This means that the expected earnings from estimation date A to next fiscal year’s 
end have to be calculated by using the definition of earnings as a change in 
shareholders equity which then forms the basis for calculating the first residual 
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where:  A =  Estimation date 
 E t[RIn]  =  Expected residual income per share for period n at time t 
  feps1  =  Forecasted earnings per share for the next (unpublished) fiscal 
year’s end 
  bvpsA  =  Book value per share at the estimation date A 
  bvps0  =  Book value per share at the previous fiscal year’s end date 0 
 days  =  Number of days between estimation date and fiscal year’s end 
n 
  r
RIV  =  Cost of equity capital under RIV. 
 
 
The projected residual income of the following periods (2, 3, 4, 5) is always 
referring to a full fiscal year and are discounted to the estimation date under the 
daily conventions (formula 1). 
In case the earnings estimator for the first future period (FY1) in I/B/E/S doesn’t 
refer to a future, but to a past fiscal year’s end date (which can occur when the fiscal 
year’s end date has already passed, but the annual report has not yet been 
published), the starting input bvps0 is not available yet and has to be calculated via 
the clean surplus relation using the previous year’s book value of equity bvps-1, the 
payout-ratio and the earnings forecast for FY1. Since this results in a loss of one 
earnings estimator, the maximum number of explicit forecasts in the detailed 
planning period is reduced to 4 years in which case, I extend the fading period by 
one additional year. 
 
Capitalized Expected Earnings (OJN) 
My OJN estimation method assuming long-term growth follows Gode/Mohanram 
(2002) who empirically implement the Ohlson/Juettner-Nauroth (2000) model. It 
builds on the Gordon Growth model and relates under a set of restrictive 
assumption current stock price to expected next year’s earnings (fesp1), dividends 
(fdps1), two-year ahead earnings (feps2), and growth of earnings (g), subdivided into 
short- (gst) and long-term (glt). This yields the pricing equation (8), which 
transforms into equation (9) for estimating the expected cost of equity capital
51 
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where:  pt  =  Price per share at time t 
  fepst  =  Forecasted earnings per share at time t 
  fdpst  =  Forecasted dividends per share at time t 
  gst  =  Short-term growth rate of earnings under OJN 
  glt  =  Long-term growth rate of earnings under OJN 
  r
OJN  =  Cost of equity capital under OJN at time t. 
 
 
I determine future growth rate inputs as in Gode/Mohanram (2002): The short-term 
growth rate g st is estimated as the average of forecasted second year earnings 
growth and the five-year earnings growth forecasts as provided by I/B/E/S. As 
proxy for the long-term growth in earnings serves the risk free rate rf (10 year REX-
return) minus 3%. 
As one can infer from equation (9), OJN estimation requires only current stock 
price and forecasts; no current accounting data (book value) as starting point is 
needed as in RIV. Therefore, no timing issues concerning the (lagged) publication 
of annual reports arise and monthly estimation can easily be implemented.
52 
However, these benefits along with requiring only forecasts for the next two periods 






                                                 
   
52 In the spirit of the simplicity of this valuation model, I do not further incorporate as in the more 
sophisticated RIV procedures the timing aspect of how far the estimation date (0) is away from the 
next (1) or following (2) fiscal year’s ends. Former research has estimated the expected cost of 
capital using OJN at the various month over the financial year (Easton 2003, in May; 
Gode/Mohanram 2002, in June; Easton 2004, in December; Hail/Leuz 2003, any month 10 month 
after fiscal year’s end).   22
3.1.2.2.Estimating Expected Cost of Equity Capital and Long-Term Growth 
Simultaneously 
 
The growth assumptions under the previous two empirical implementations of RIV 
and OJN as taken from the original studies are different and hence inconsistent with 
each other. Further, it is well known that nominal future (residual) earnings growth 
is determined by the level of conservatism in accounting (Zhang 2000) and by 
expected inflation (Hail/Leuz 2003). While the inflation rates have been remarkably 
stable in Germany over the sample period, the issue of conservatism in accounting 
is particularly relevant here for firms switching from one accounting system to 
another. Accordingly, I further apply estimation procedures which jointly estimate 
in a regression framework this long-term growth rate of (residual) earnings together 
with the expected cost of equity capital. This method cannot be applied at the 
individual firm, however, but only at the portfolio level. In order to control for other 
omitted risk characteristics, I focus on the switch firms only. I further run the 
estimation not monthly, but at particular dates since simultaneous estimation has 
only been performed on portfolios in which each firm-observation enters only 
once,
53 and independence of observations included in the sample is a requirement 




Residual Income Valuation (RIV) and Simultaneous Estimation 
The first simultaneous estimation procedure based on RIV is a modification of 
ETSS (2002). They apply a single-stage perpetuity method using the Gordon 
growth formula in which the present value of the firm’s future residual income 
adding to its book value of equity is computed as residual income of the next period 
divided by the cost of equity capital minus the growth rate of residual income. Since 
this specification would disregard the information available about the forecasted 
analyst consensus estimates of the following periods, however, projected earnings 
are cumulated as aggregate earnings over the period of four future years as in 
Easton/Harris/Ohlson (1992) and in formula (10), a future period is thus not one 
                                                 
53 See ETSS (2002), pp. 663-666 and Easton (2004), pp. 83-85. 
   
54 The lack of independence of monthly earnings forecasts and stock prices could reduce the 
accuracy of inferences as independence between observations is an important assumption present in 
bootstrapping based inference. A more advanced approach would be to use moving blocks bootstrap. 
See Efron/Tibshirani 1993, pp. 99-102.   23
year, but a four-year period. The fundamental value of a firm using an aggregate 
earnings approach including is then estimated as: 















× − + −
+ =  
where:  pt  =  Price per share at time t 
 bvpst  =  Book value per share at time t 
 X cT  =  Aggregate earnings over 4 years including interest on 
reinvested dividends 
 g
RI  =  Infinite growth rate of residual income under ETSS (2002) 
  r
RIV  =  Cost of equity capital under RIV 
  
 
Given the two unknown variables to be estimated (r
RIV and g
RI) in equation (10), it 
can only be solved by adding similar firms to a portfolio and by running the 
following regression obtained after rearrangements on this portfolio: 
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where:  xcT j,t  =  Aggregate four-years earnings of firm j at time t 
  bvpsj,t  =  Book value per share of firm j at time t 
  p j,t  =  Price per share of firm j at time t 
  t j, ε   =  Error term of the linear regression 
α  =  Regression  intercept 
β   =  Regression slope coefficient 
 g
RI  =  Infinite growth rate of residual income under ETSS (2002) 
  r
RIV  =  Cost of equity capital under RIV 
 
The regression coefficients α and β represent the average expected cost of equity 
capital and the average infinite growth rate of residual income for the firms 
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When solving for the regression-function, a circularity problem exists as the 
solution to be found (r
RIV) is also needed as input parameter into the regression 
through aggregate earnings XcT. This issue is resolved by an iterative process 
starting from an initial arbitrary value of r
RIV= 12% to be repeated until the 
difference between starting value and solution converges to zero. 
I further implement monthly estimation in the original approach of ETSS (2002) 
which allows the inclusion of firms with different fiscal year’s ends in the 
portfolio.
55 As in RIV assuming long-term growth, I calculate a starting book value 
of equity for each firm at the estimation date by adding compound interest to the 
last fiscal year’s shareholder equity and reduce the expected earnings for FY1 by 
the same amount. Since I keep the length of earnings aggregation over a four year 
window constant (from starting, monthly estimation date A to ending date P), I also 
have to perform a similar adjustment at the ending date P for the calculation of total 
aggregate earnings, again assuming the dividends are paid out at the fiscal year’s 
end dates. For example, in the case the first earnings estimator refers to a future 
fiscal year’s end, the projected last earnings forecast used is calculated as: 
 
(13)  ] 1 ) 1 [( 365
) ), 4 ( (
5 4 − + × = ′
P period of date end year days
p FROE bvps s fep  
where:  Et[RIn]  =  Expected residual income per share for period n at time t 
  P  =  Date at which the four year window ends, starting from 
estimation date A 
 feps’P  =  Forecasted earnings per share for the time between the fiscal 
year’s end date four and the end date P   
 bvps4  =  Book value per share at the fiscal year’s end date four 
  days  =  Number of days between fiscal year’s end date four and the 
end date P   
  fepst  =  Forecasted earnings per share at time t 
 FROE5  =  Forecasted book return on equity for the fiscal year 5 
 
I use the four year window as in the original ETSS (2002) study in order to include 
the maximum number of detailed analyst consensus forecasts available. In case not 
all necessary future earnings estimates are available, I approximate these forecasts 
by applying an artificial growth rate of earnings implicit in the available (at least 
three years) previous period earnings as in equation (2). 
                                                 
   
55 The original study includes only December fiscal year’s end firms. See ETSS (2002), pp. 664. For 
a detailed discussion of the adjusted estimation procedure, see Daske/Gebhardt/Klein (2004), pp. 15-
18.   25
Capitalized Expected Earnings (OJN) and Simultaneous Estimation 
The second simultaneous estimation method based on OJN is taken from Easton 
(2004). He estimates the perpetual long-term earnings growth rate together with the 
implied cost of equity capital in a portfolio of stocks instead of assuming it as in 
Gode/Mohanram (2002). Under his definition, total growth is divided into short-
term expected growth in cum-dividend accounting earnings from period one to two 
(agr1) and long-term change in abnormal growth in earnings (∆agr). The OJN 
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where:  pt  =  Price per share at time t 
  fepst  =  Forecasted earnings per share at time t 
  fdpst  =  Forecasted dividends per share at time t 
 g lt  =  Long-term growth rate of earnings under OJN 
  ∆agr  =  Long-term change in abnormal growth in earnings under 
Easton (2004)  
 r
OJN  =  Cost of equity capital under OJN 
 
   
 
Similar to the idea in ETSS (2002), a linear regression (14) is run on a portfolio of 
stocks obtained after rearrangements of equation (13), the circularity problem again 
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where:  
  fepsj,t = Forecasted  next-periods  earnings per share for firm j at time t 
 fdpsj,t  =  Forecasted next-periods dividends per share for firm j at time 
t 
  Pj,0  =  Price per share of firm j at time 0 
 fcepsj,2  =  Forecasted two-period ahead cum-dividend earnings per share 
for firm j 
  ∆agr  =  Long-term change in abnormal growth in earnings under 
Easton (2004)  
 r
OJN  =  Cost of equity capital under OJN 
  t j, ε   =  Error term of the linear regression 
α  =  Regression  intercept 
β   =  Regression slope coefficient 
 
The regression coefficients α and β the represent the average expected cost of equity 
capital r
OJN and the average long-run change in abnormal growth in earnings ∆agr 



















Data-based simulation and Testing for Differences in Simultaneous Estimations 
A bootstrap procedure as data-based simulation method for statistical interference 
(see Efron/Tibshirani 1993) is put forward to formally test differences in expected 
cost of capital when estimated simultaneously with long-term growth in a 
regression framework. Under bootstrapping, from the total number of observations 
at a specific estimation date, for example prior to the switch (npre),  npre firm-
observations are drawn randomly with replacement from the total set npre. Each 
simulated subsample then enters into the ETSS (2002) and Easton (2004) 
regressions which estimate a set of combinations of expected cost of capital (r) and 
future growth rate (g). Repeating this procedure with B=1000 iterations yields 
empirical distributions of r and g. The various generated distributions can then be 
exploited to apply test statistic. For a test of the difference in the expected values of 
r and g, for example pre and post the adoption of internationally recognized 
standards, I use Wilcoxon non-parametric test statistics on the generated 
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distributions as well as simulation-based test statistics for testing the equality of 




Table 2 lists the input variables for my estimations and their data sources. I use the 
IBES Summary History File – Version 2.0 as of January 2003 for analyst consensus 
earnings forecasts, the number of shares outstanding and stock prices. Data on book 
value of equity, payout-ratio, industry classification as well as the industry target-
ROE come from Thomson Financial Analytics – Worldscope. Finally, my proxy for 
the risk-free rate is the 10 year REX-return collected from Datastream. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
In order to have broad coverage in I/B/E/S on analyst forecast data, I initially limit 
my analysis to the period from January 1989 to December 2002. The starting 
number of all available 69,785 earnings forecast observations on German listed 
firms for that period in I/B/E/S was reduced by: 
(1)  Financial data missing after merging databases on shares outstanding, share 
price, accounting data and target-ROE resulted in a loss of 17.37% of total 
observations. 
(2)  The market’s consensus earnings forecasts are a key determinant of the 
estimation procedure. In order to ensure that my inputs really measure market 
expectations over the relevant forecast horizon, I require from each 
observation either at least consensus EPS-forecasts for the next three periods 
(out of a theoretically maximum of five periods available in I/B/E/S) or 
consensus EPS forecasts for the next two periods and a long-term growth rate 
(applying to periods three to five). This represents in my view the best trade-
off between extracting market expectations on the one hand and a 
representative sample size including smaller firms on the other. I loose 
another 35.77% of the initial observations for which I have only FY1 or FY1 
and FY2 forecasts. 
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(3)  I try to minimize data errors by deleting forecast data of questionable quality. 
This included (a) stacked forecasts (4.72%) and (b) insolvency forecasts 
(0.74%). 
(a) Stacked forecasts: According to § 325 (1) HGB, annual reports 
should be available within nine month after the end of the fiscal year. 
I delete all forecasts which refer to a fiscal year’s end longer than 
nine months ago and most probably have not been updated in-time 
by the database. 
(b) Insolvency forecasts: In some special cases analysts estimate losses 
which would result in a negative book value of equity in a future 
period and thus would lead to the firm’s insolvency if no additional 
equity capital will be provided. I delete such observations as not 
representative. 
(4)  I finally restrict my analysis to the period from fiscal year 1993 onwards – the 
period in time in which the first German firms began to report their results 
according to International standards (Daimler-Benz, reconciliation to US-
GAAP; Puma, parallel report in IAS). 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 summarizes my sample selection procedure. The final sample consists of 
24,359 observations across all estimation months and is based on a set of 735 
German companies for which I identify their financial reporting standards applied 
for each fiscal year’s end as described in the auditors statement of a firm’s annual 
report (on Thomson Research). In total, 155 firms only reported under IAS/IFRS 
and 127 only under US-GAAP; 52 switched from German GAAP (HGB) to 
IAS/IFRS and 24 to US-GAAP. The remaining 377 companies reported their results 
under HGB. 
I code each firm-month observation according to the financial reporting standards 
applied in the last available annual report on which analysts base their forecasts on. 
For example, before Puma had published their first International report in Mai 1994 
for the fiscal year ending 31/12/1993, Puma monthly observations were coded 
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“HGB”, after that date from June 1994, the following data-points were coded 
“IAS/IFRS”. The total number of 24,359 estimates in the “All” sample split into 
16,250 HGB, 4,567 IAS/IFRS and 3,542 US-GAAP observations; the subgroup of 
76 firms which switched their accounting standards labeled “Switch” sample 
consists of 6,459 total observations, of which are 4,064 HGB, 1,564 IAS/IFRS and 
831 US-GAAP. Since I estimate the expected cost of equity capital monthly, my 
total sample is comparable in size to previous US-studies on estimating the implied 
cost of capital.
56  It is substantially larger the samples of former studies on the 
economic consequences of applying international standards,
57 also because I include 
the period until 2002. 
 
3.2.  Empirical Results     
 
3.2.1  Descriptive Statistics of the Cost of Equity Capital Estimates 
 
Table 4, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for my expected cost of equity 
capital estimates using RIV estimation (rRIV) or OJN estimation (rOJN) for the “All” 
and “Switch” sample. The average expected cost of equity capital of German firms 
is 11.44% (11.72%) under RIV (OJN) in the period from 1993 to 2002. These cost 
of equity capital estimates are reasonably close to each other, but typically on 
average higher under OJN than under RIV. They are comparable in magnitude to 
estimates in other studies applying the same methods.
58 Mean return expectations 
for the full sample are higher than in the switch sample with estimates of 9.30% 
(10.69%). 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
When segmenting firms according to their reporting standards, international GAAP 
reporters (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) exhibit higher expected cost of equity capital on 
                                                 
56  GLS (2001) use 18,615, Claus/Thomas (2001) use 33,389 and ETSS (2002) use 26,561 total 
observations. 
57 Leuz/Verrecchia (2000) use 90, Leuz (2003) uses 341 and Cuijpers/Buijink (2003) use 80 
observations. 
   
58 See, for example, Guay/Kothari/Shu (2003), p. 34, Gode/Mohanram (2002), pp. 29-31, Hail/Leuz 
(2003), pp. 26-27.   30
average than local GAAP reporters (HGB). For the full sample (“All”), mean cost 
of equity capital are 9.85% (11.10%) for HGB, but 14.34% (13.21%) for IAS/IFRS 
and even higher with 14.99% (13.13%) for US-GAAP firms. The differences 
between local GAAP and IAS/IFRS as well as US-GAAP are highly statistically 
significant. Such findings appear to be attributable to the differing sample 
compositions of the three subgroups: Whereas the HGB set of firms comprise 
mostly traditional, “old economy” firms, the majority of the international GAAP 
groups include generally more risky young, “new economy” firms from Germany’s 
former “New Market”. When looking only at the switch sample with mostly 
traditional firms (“Switch”), the difference between HGB (8.56%, 10.34%) and 
IAS/IFRS (10.27%, 10.97%) or US-GAAP (11.06%, 11.79%) declines, but still 
exists. 
Further, during my sample period, a clear trend of rising expected cost of equity 
capital and risk premia emerges which is important to consider when comparing 
firms which switched their reporting standards. Table 4, Panel B, displays for 1993 
mean expected cost of equity capital of 7.75% (9.22%) and risk premia of 1.48% 
(2.98%). Average required returns are steadily increasing up to 17.12% (15.28%) 
for the cost of equity capital and 12.58% (10.76%) for the risk premium in 2002. 
This trend is highly statistically significant, remarkable in magnitude and 
independent of the estimation method applied. It further contradicts reasoning that 
the increased globalization will cause the equity premia to decline in financial 
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3.2.2.  Estimation of Expected Cost of Equity Capital Assuming Long-Term 
Growth 
 
3.2.2.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
3.2.2.1.1. Risk Factors 
 
In my cross-sectional analysis, I analyze the relationship between implied risk 
premia and financial reporting dummies (HGB vs. IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) when 
controlling for important other factors which have been found to be related to a 
firm’s risk. These are:
59 
Systematic and Unsystematic Risk  
The Capital Asset Pricing Models (CAPM) predicts a positive linear association 
between a firm’s measure of systematic risk (beta) and its expected risk premium. 
As common in the literature, I estimate the beta of each stock based on a five-year 
rolling regression using monthly returns and the value-weighted Composite DAX 
(CDAX) index as market proxy.
60  Since prior studies have also documented a 
positive relationship between a stock’s volatility as measure for unsystematic risk 
and its future returns (Malkiel/Xu 1997), I include volatility independend variable 
measured as annualized standard deviation from previous year’s daily discrete stock 
returns, assuming 250 trading days in a year.
61 
Financial Leverage 
According to financial theory, a firm’s cost of equity capital should be an increasing 
function of the debt-to-equity ratio. Empirically, Fama/French (1992) document a 
positive relationship between market leverage and realized stock returns. I use the 
ratio of long-term debt (at book value) to the market value of equity at fiscal year’s 
end. 
Information Environment 
Information produced by intermediaries such as financial analysts can further lower 
the information asymmetry between a firm and its investors, and thus lower the risk 
premium required. I use the number of analysts following as proxy for the general 
                                                 
59 See also GLS (2001) and Gode/Mohanram (2002). 
60 I require at least 24 data-points (monthly returns) for an estimation. The CDAX includes about 
750 listed stocks traded on the official market and proxies the German stock market. 
   
61 See, for example, Steiner/Bruns (2000), pp. 57-59.   32
information environment of a firm, hypothesizing that the risk premium is lower for 
firms with more analysts following. 
Stock Market Anomalies 
Empirical studies have documented variables which have no explicit foundation in 
theory, but which have been shown to be statistically associated with realized or 
expected returns (Elton/Gruber 1995 for an overview). The book-to-market ratio 
(B/M) and firm size (as log market capitalization of equity) are among the most 
prominent and are included in the Fama/French Three Factor model   
(Fama/French 1992). The authors show that high B/M firms earn higher returns ex-
post than do low B/M firms. Similarly, firms of large (small) size earn lower (higher) 
returns. I control for the Fama/French factors as they have also been found to be 
related to return expectations (see GLS 2001). 
Industry Membership 
Firms in a specific industry share similar business risks and often similar accounting 
choices. Estimations of the cost of equity capital using realized returns have often 
been performed at the industry, rather than at the individual firm level. GLS (2001) 
find that industry effects explain much of the cross-sectional variation in expected 
risk premia. I control for industry effects by including the average industry expected 
risk premium of the previous year in my analysis. 
Time 
Absent a theoretical background, but given the obvious (increasing) trend of 
expected risk premia in Table 4, Panel A, I control in my pooled regressions for 
time by including a monthly count variable, beginning in January 1993 (=1) and 
ending in December 2002 (=120). 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for my control variables after I have 
winsorized the top and bottom 1% observations. I display descriptive statistics for 
each variable under the full set as well as divided into the three reporting regimes 
(HGB, IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP).  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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For the full sample (“All”) in Panel A, the REX return as proxy for the risk free rate 
of return used to derive the expected risk premia from the estimated cost of equity 
capital is on average 5.10%. An analysis of the traditional risk metrics confirms the 
argument explaining different estimates of cost of capital in table 4 as companies in 
the international reporting subgroups IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP are more risky than 
the local GAAP subgroup. Whereas mean beta for all firms is with 0.953 reasonably 
close to the full market’s value of one, the international reporting subgroups show 
on average much higher values with 1,167 (IAS/IFRS) and 1,443 (US-GAAP) than 
the local GAAP group with 0,830 (HGB). This is confirmed when looking at the 
stock’s volatility as the international GAAP samples show significantly higher 
values (0.400; 0.480) than the HGB samples (0.215). The view that the international 
GAAP reporters belong to more risky industries is further supported when looking 
at the lagged expected industry risk premia variable. Under these risk metrics, the 
US-GAAP subsample appears to be altogether the most risky showing even higher 
average values than the IAS/IFRS set. Table 5, Panel A further illustrates that 
international reporting firms are on average smaller, less covered by financial 
analysts and less leveraged than their local GAAP counterparts. 
When looking only at the switch firms in table 5, Panel B (“Switch”), the HGB 
observations are all pre-switch whereas the IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP observations 
are all post-switch. Here the descriptive statistics for the traditional risk variables 
are inconclusive: Beta as measure for systematic risk decreases from 0.940 under 
HGB to 0.921 under US-GAAP and even 0.768 under IAS/IFRS. However, Vola as 
measure for unsystematic risk increases from 0.184 to 0.230 (IAS/IFRS) and 0.237 
(US-GAAP). Interestingly, the median number of analysts following decreased 
after the switch from starting 29 to 26 (IAS/IFRS) and 27 (US-GAAP). This is 
contrary to the presumption that higher disclosure increases analyst following (e.g. 
Lang/Lundholm 1996). It reflects either the specific situation after the sharp decline 
of the global stock markets around 2000 or alternatively that more public available 
information in the international reports may have decreased the benefits from 
analyzing German firms’ financial statements. The fact that leading representatives 
of the German Financial Analyst Society (DVFA) have consistently expressed their 
concerns about the benefits of analyzing internationally recognized financial reports 
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and have consistently put forward their own tools analyzing local financial reports 
would be consistent with the later argument.
62  
Table 6 displays correlations between the variables. The parametric (non-parametric) 
correlation between my two expected cost of equity capital estimates rRIV and rOJN 
are with 0.692 (0.603) higher than in comparable studies.
63  The signs of the 
correlations between the cost of equity capital estimates and my control variables 
are in line with expectations: rRIV and rOJN are negatively correlated with the risk 
free rate of return and the information environment variables, but positively 
correlated with all other variables. Generally, these univariate relations are also 
consistent with prior research in this area such as GLS 2001 and Gode/Mohanram 
2002. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
3.2.2.1.2. Multivariate Analysis 
 
I use two methods for my multivariate analysis. In the cross-sectional regressions, I 
apply pooled linear GLS regressions for which I use clustering of the firm’s 
residuals in order to control for potential autocorrelation in my monthly cost of 
capital estimates which are relatively stable over time (Table 5, Panel A1 and B1). 
While this first approach assumes a constant relationship between the factors during 
my investigation period, the second accounts for intertemporal stability of the 
relationship between the variables. In these panel regressions, I use 120 
(standardized) monthly cross-sectional Fama-McBeth (1973) regressions over the 
period from January 1993 to December 2002 (Table 5, Panel A2 and B2). The 
standardization of the variables to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one 
allows to measure the relative influence of each explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable.
64  
                                                 
62 See, for example, “Aussagekraft der Bilanzdaten wird angezweifelt; Geiger: US-GAAP und IAS 
taugen nicht für die Unternehmensbewertung – Kaldemorgen: Schwächen übertüncht“, 
Börsenzeitung, July 5, 2003. 
63 These are 0.533 in Hail/Leuz 2003 and 0.501 in Guay/Kothari/Shu 2003. 
   
64 See Gujarati (2003), p. 174 and similarly GLS (2001), p. 164.   35
Each panel of table 7 reports results for both cost of equity capital estimators as 
dependent variables (rRIV and rOJN) as well as for two different sets of independent 
variables (Models 1 and 2). Panel A applies the full sample (“All”) while panel B is 
restricted to switch firms only (“Switch”). In table 7, panel A1, pooled cross-
sectional GLS regressions are run on the full sample. In model (1a), the expected 
cost of equity capital estimators are regressed on the financial reporting dummies 
IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP (HGB taking the base value of zero) and on the risk 
factors of the Fama/French (1992) Three-Factor model as well as on lagged industry 
risk premium and on a time count variable in order to control for the special sample 
composition. In model (2a), the variables omitted in model (1a) due to their high 
correlation with one of the Fama/French (1992) risk factors are exchanged for these 
factors: The number of analysts following replaces size and the debt-to-market-ratio 
follows book-to-market. In table 7, panel A2, the same combinations of dependent 
and independent variables are utilized in Fama/McBeth (1973) regressions. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The explanatory power of my regressions ranges from high 73.70% of model (1a) 
under RIV to low 16.08% of model (2b) under OJN and thus varies considerably 
depending on the regression model and the variables included in the analysis. The 
explanatory power always shows to be higher when cost of equity capital estimates 
under RIV rather than under OJN are used as dependent variable, when the 
independent variables of model (1) rather than of model (2) are employed or when 
pooled cross-sectional GLS regressions instead of Fama/McBeth (1973) regressions 
are utilized. As such, these fit statistics for my German sample resemble the results 
of comparable studies on the U.S. market utilizing the same research 
methodology.
65 
The signs of the coefficients of my control variables generally turn out to be in the 
hypothesized direction and are statistically significant in most cases, particularly 
when regressed on rRIV. In Panel A1, the three risk factors of the Fama/French 
(1992) model (Beta, Ln_size, BM) show to be highly significant at the 1% level 
                                                 
   
65 See GLS (2001), p. 164, Gode/Mohanram (2002), pp. 33-34.   36
under model (1a). The trend of increasing cost of equity capital over time is 
confirmed by the high significance of the time variable with its positive coefficient. 
When under model (2a) the number of analyst following (No.) and the leverage 
proxy (DM) are included, they also show to be significant at the 1% level. The 
factor loadings generally decline relative to the pooled results when using 
Fama/McBeth (1973) regressions in Panel A2, however. Still, size and book-to-
market remain highly significant determinants, whereas beta turns only weakly 
significant at the 10% level in model (1b) and even insignificant in model (2b). 
Unsystematic risk (Vola) is insignificant in most regressions. Results using the 
switch firms only in Panel B are qualitatively similar, although less control variable 
show to be significant, especially under model (2d). The relative influence of the 
lagged industry risk premium variable is substantial in case of rRIV, and to a lower 
extend also under rOJN. For example, under the standardized Fama/McBeth (1973) 
regressions in model (2b), an increase of the industry risk premium by 100 basis 
points would lead on average to an increase of the firm’s expected risk premium of 
53 basis points under RIV and of 24 basis points under OJN. This confirms the 
conclusion of GLS (2001) that “industry membership should be an important 
characteristic in cost of capital estimation” (p. 138). 
The financial reporting standards applied by a firm, however, does not turn out to be 
an important determinant of the expected risk premium for my German sample 
firms in the cross-section. This result equally applies to the various model 
specifications and variables used: In 14 out of total 16 regressions in table 7, the 
international reporting dummies show to be insignificant, both for IAS/IFRS and for 
US-GAAP. Only when using model (1a), the US-GAAP dummy only in case of 
RIV (1.91) and the IAS/IFRS dummy only in case of OJN (2.42) show to be weakly 
significant, however with positive coefficients contrary to initial expectations. Also, 
when comparing the magnitude of the standardized coefficients in Panel A2 and B2, 
the relative influence of IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP on the cost of equity capital 
estimates is negligible relative to other risk characteristics such as a firm’s industry, 
its size or its book-to-market-ratio. Therefore, I fail to document cross-sectionally a 
statistically significant effect of the reporting regime on a firm’s implied cost of 
equity capital. 
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3.2.1.2 Time-Series Analysis around the Switch “Event” 
 
Utilizing the cost of equity capital estimates assuming long-term growth in an 
“event”-type time-series analysis, I analyze the development of a firm’s required 
risk premium over time around the switch from local to international GAAP.
66 A 
time frame of maximum six years, three years pre and three years post the switch 
“event” which marks the first fiscal year in which a firm fully adopted either 
IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP is examined. I look at not only the absolute risk premium, 
but also control for the general market trend by looking at the relative risk premium 
for which I deduct from each individual firm’s risk premium estimate the average of 
all my sample firms at each estimation month as proxy for the market risk premium. 
Then the difference in the average monthly expected risk premium over a period of 
one, two and three years before to after the adoption of IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP for 
the switch firms is compared and tested. Since not all switch firms have a complete 
series of monthly observations over the full time window, I calculate for each firm 
an average of all available monthly estimates pre and post the switch which then 
enter the analysis and ensure that all firms have an equal weight.
67  
Table 8 presents the results, Panel A for the IAS/IFRS and Panel B for the US-
GAAP adopters. The number of firms for which a time series of equal length is 
available pre and post the switch “event” is reduced when moving from plus/minus 
one year (49 IAS/IFRS; 21 US-GAAP firms) to longer periods of plus/minus two or 
plus/minus three years (23 IAS/IFRS /17 US-GAAP firms).  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
The analysis of the absolute risk premium shows that in all cases both for IAS/IFRS 
and US-GAAP adopters such premia increased when a company moved from local 
to international reporting. The mean or median difference of the equity premium 
from after to before the switch “event” (rpt+1-rpt-1) is nearly in all cases positive (22 
                                                 
66 See also Leuz/Verrecchia (2000), pp. 113-120 for an analysis of the development of indirect risk 
proxies around the switch “event” and Asbaugh/Pincus (2001), pp. 427-430 for the development of 
analyst forecasts after IAS adoption. 
   
67 Results were similar when using instead of average risk premia in the time window per and post 
the event specific points in time, for example, at a particular month plus/minus 12/24/36 month from 
a firm’s switch date.   38
out of total 24), except for the OJN estimates in the years plus/minus one. While 
these two negative differences are insignificant, the positive mean differences 
further show to be highly statistically significant under parametric t-statistics for 
IAS/IFRS and also for US-GAAP in the periods plus/minus two and three years. 
The positive median differences are mostly statistically significant under RIV 
estimation, but not significant under OJN in the case of IAS/IFRS and only weakly 
significant for US-GAAP in the periods plus/minus two and three. The result of 
increasing risk premia contrary to initial expectations, however, has to be judged on 
the background of the overshadowing general trend of rising return expectations 
over the sample period. The monotonously increasing magnitude of the difference 
in expected returns when moving from plus/minus one year to plus/minus two and 
three years would support this explanation. 
When looking at the relative risk premium controlling for the market trend, a 
different picture emerges. The always negative mean and median relative risk 
premia initially demonstrate that the switch firms come from “traditional” industries 
and are on average less risky than the general market. Looking at expected return 
differences around the switch, they show to be in the majority of cases negative (19 
out of total 24) which means that relative risk premia decreased after adoption of 
IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP in line with initial expectations. However, in five cases 
particularly under IAS/IFRS in the short run, this difference turns positive. Further, 
they show to be statistically significant only for the mean differences and when 
using the RIV approach in the periods plus/minus three for IAS/IFRS and 
plus/minus two years for US-GAAP (in two out of total 24 cases). Accordingly, I 
overall fail to document significant effects of the adoption of international standards 
on the expected relative risk premia of switching firms, both for IAS/IFRS and US-
GAAP adopters. 
Altogether, when applying expected cost of equity estimates assuming long-term 
growth rates, neither the cross-sectional, nor the time series analysis indicate any 
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3.2.3.  Estimation of Expected Cost of Equity Capital and Growth 
Simultaneously 
 
When estimating the expected cost of equity capital simultaneously with the 
expected long-term growth rates (instead of assuming it as in the previous sections), 
only estimation at the portfolio level is possible which raises several control issues. 
In order to compare the effect of different accounting standards applied across 
portfolios, they should else reflect comparable risk characteristics. 
In order to control for individual firm’s risk, my first “event”-type approach pools 
all switch firm-observations plus and minus two years relative to the month when 
their first international report was published and compares the estimates under 
ETSS (2002) and Easton (2004) regressions before to after the switch. By including 
exactly the same firms in the pre- and post-sample, I control for the other risk 
characteristics of the portfolios, except shifts in return expectations over time. 
However, the observed trend of rising return expectations over time when 
estimating required returns assuming long-term growth stresses the necessity to 
control for such a potential trend here. Accordingly, in my second approach, I 
choose a set of firms from the industrial sector which face comparable business 
risks and of which firms have switched to international standards over time. Absent 
the possibility to use a paired-sample approach due to the unavailability of proper 
matches for most switching companies, I form at each third Thursday in September 
from 1997 to 2002 two portfolios, one for the group of local and one for the group 
of international GAAP reporters. Note that the composition of firms in the two 
portfolios thus changes over time reflecting the increasing (decreasing) number of 
international (local) GAAP reporters. I then compare each year at the same point in 
time the estimated expected cost of capital and growth rates for the local and the 
international GAAP reporters. Accordingly, in this approach, I control for time, but 
compare across portfolios of firms with potentially differing risk characteristics not 
captured by industry. 
Table 9, Panel A presents results using my first “event”-type approach and applying 
ETSS (2002) and Easton (2004) type regressions on the initial set of 54 switch firm 
observations winsorized by individual outliers. The coefficients of the two 
regressions are positive as expected and highly significant. Under ETSS (2002), the 
intercept is with 0.2839 pre-switch lower than the smallest value reported for the 
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U.S., but in case of post-switch (0.3941) within the U.S. range. The values of the 
slope coefficients are also on the lower end of ETSS (2002). The explanation power 
instead is comparable to prior research as adjusted R-squares are with 52.54% pre-
switch and 47.85% post-switch even higher than in ETSS (2002) (42 %).
68 Under 
Easton (2004), intercepts are as expected close to zero (0.0091; 0.0094) and slopes 
close to one (0.9990; 1.1430), but adjusted R
2’s with 90.30% (83.92%) lower than 
in Easton (2004) (99%).
69 
The estimates of r under the methodology of ETSS (2002) and Easton (2004) show 
increasing cost of equity capital after the switch to IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP. Using 
the methodology of ETSS (2002), expected rates of return increase from 9.57% pre- 
to 11.84% post-switch. Under the methodology of Easton (2004), they even enlarge 
from 9.51% to 19.20%. Further, not only return expectations, but also projected 
long-term growth rates rise from 6.45% pre- to 8.66% post-switch under ETSS 
(2002) and even from -0.10% to 14.30% under Easton (2004). The finding of higher 
long-term growth rates in earnings under international rules thus further documents 
generally rising future expectations in the period during which most firms adopted 
international standards. 
Table 9, Panel B shows descriptive statistics for the distributions of expected cost of 
equity capital and projected long-term growth rates pre- and post-switch when 
applying the bootstrapping method. Figure 1 plots the estimates of r and g (∆agr) 
obtained under these 1000 regressions. Generally, mean and median estimates under 
bootstrapping are close to the values determined under the regressions using the 
regular sample in Panel A. Bootstrapping adds by documenting the dispersion of the 
estimates depending on the various subsamples drawn and by enabling statistical 
testing of differences in the estimates pre- and post-switch. These differences in 
expected cost of capital and future growth rates show to be highly statistically 
significant, thus underline the significance of the increasing rates after IAS/IFRS or 
US-GAAP adoption.  
This shift in return expectations can also be seen in figure 1, Panel A for the ETSS 
(2002) regressions. The overall shape of the histograms of r and g pre- (Panel A1) 
                                                 
68 See ETSS (2002), pp. 664-665, also Cuijpers/Buijink (2003), p. 43. 
   
69 See Easton (2004), pp. 83-85. My inferior fit statistics for this second approach reflect the much 
smaller sample size and thus the impossibility to form reasonable portfolios on the magnitude of the 
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and post- (Panel A2) switch look similar, however the entire post-switch 
distributions have shifted towards higher values. Looking further at the statistical 
summary metrics in table 9, Panel B reveals that the dispersion of the estimates has 
also increased after the switch equally applying to the standard deviation, 
interquartile range (IQR) and total range of the distributions. While increased 
dispersion in the estimates post-switch is comparatively small under ETSS (2002), 
it is large under Easton (2004). Figure 1, Panel B documents this graphically. While 
the spreading in the estimates of r and ∆agr pre-switch is higher than under ETSS 
(2002), but still within a reasonable band, the dispersion of the variables post-switch 
questions the meaningfulness of the obtained average cost of equity capital and 
growth rate estimates. For example, the mean cost of capital estimate rpost of 20.70% 
under Easton (2004) has a standard deviation of 6.71% and a range of 40.60%. The 
dispersion of the long-term growth rate ∆agr post-switch is even higher. Taken 
these results together, they document that the divergence of expected cost of equity 
capital estimates of the same firms included in the portfolios increased considerably 
after IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP adoption. Besides changes in general market 
expectations, this could also be interpreted as indication that not only IAS/IFRS or 
US-GAAP adoption per se, but also the “style of application” of these rules or the 
specific competitive and institutional environment of an adopting firm determines 
changes in cost of capital. The Easton (2004) approach, utilizing only current 
market price and one and two-year ahead expectations naturally is more sensitive to 
such changes than the ETSS (2002) approach which also exploits information in 
mid-term projections and book value of equity. 
The second approach includes only the switch firms which can be classified as 
“industrial” (SIC codes 20 to 39 for Manufacturing, n=39). Table 9, Panel C lists 
the number of firms included in the international (nInt) and local (nHGB) GAAP 
portfolios from 1997 until 2001 with available observations used for bootstrapping 
ranging from a minimum of 7 to a maximum of 29. The reported median 
differences in expected cost of equity capital between international and local 
reporting show to be positive in 4 out of 5 years under the RIV model (except in 
1998) indicating that required returns for firms in similar industries and measured at 
the same points in time are in the majority of cases higher for IAS/IFRS or US-
GAAP adopters. These differences further show to be highly statistically significant 
using parametric or non-parametric test statistics. Under Easton (2004), the 
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estimates generally are more volatile than under ETSS (2002) and also median 
differences in rInt. versus rHGB show unreasonable extreme values in 2000 and 2001 
around the time when the stock markets in Germany crashed. Even more, the results 
are diverging among the two models in 1997, 1998 and 1999. Across the two 
models and over 5 years, therefore, no clear picture emerges overall as the 
differences in cost of capital among the international and local GAAP reporters are 




In this paper, I investigate empirically the common claim that financial reporting 
under internationally accepted standards lowers the cost of equity capital of 
adopting firms. Using a large set of German companies which pre-adopted the 
compulsory IFRS adoption in the EU from 2005/2007, I find no supporting 
evidence for such a conjecture. In the cross-section, other risk factors statistically 
show to be more important determinants of a firm’s expected returns. In the time-
series, average changes in required returns are insignificant with a substantial 
variation in individual firms’ changes in expected cost of equity capital after 
IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP adoption. These empirical results largely question the 
widespread notion that adopting internationally recognized reporting standards, per 
se, leads to the economic benefits of lower cost of equity capital for adopting firms. 
One basic explanation for these findings could be the general difficulties in 
estimating the cost of equity capital and the potential imprecision of the implied 
estimates based on analyst forecasts, particularly when utilized across different 
accounting standards. However, implied estimation can be considered the state-of-
the-art methodology in accounting research as of today and has been used by related 
research which has achieved in documenting significant differences in the cost of 
equity capital across firms or jurisdictions, both when measured within (Botosan 
1997) and across accounting regimes (Hail/Leuz 2003). 
A competing explanation could be the nature of the internationalization process in 
Germany itself. The transition from the “Bilanzrecht” to the “International 
Accounting Standards” (Van Hulle 2003) has resulted in a rich accounting diversity 
with firms alternatively reporting under HGB, IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP. In fact, this 
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process has increased the magnitude of available information about selected 
individual firms, but has also decreased the comparability of financial reports within 
Germany. The variety and speed of the “accounting revolution” may have affected 
the apparent uncertainty among investors during this transition period. Empirical 
findings of decreasing analyst forecast accuracy after non-local GAAP adoption 
(Cuijpers/Buijink 2003) as well as articles in the financial press describing such 
difficulties would support this reasoning. 
Alternatively, generally insignificant differences in the cost of capital among local 
GAAP, IAS/IFRS and US-GAAP adopters would also be consistent with the view 
that the financial reporting standards applied are not as important as other (more 
fundamental) risks factors. They would further be consistent with the view that the 
institutional factors rather than the accounting standards applied largely determine 
the quality of financial reporting. The fact that Hail/Leuz (2003) manage to 
document significantly different cost of equity capital across the effectiveness of a 
country’s legal institutions and securities regulations whereas differences appear to 
be rather small across accounting regimes when holding the institutional setting 
constant in this study would support such line of argument. 
In order to distinguish between these competing explanations, future research 
should exploit the substantial variation in the changes in cost of equity capital 
between firms adopting IFRS or US-GAAP and should try to better understand 
under which conditions and circumstances both within and across countries and 
jurisdictions the adoption of IFRS leads a to measurable and economically 
significant reductions in firms’ cost of capital. The variation in adoption strategies, 
“style of application” of the rules as well as corporate governance and ownership 
affecting reporting incentives across firms within Germany and in particular the 
institutional background of the countries around the world adopting IFRS will offer 
a rich testing field for such an analysis in the future. 
   44  
REFERENCES 
American Accounting Association’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee 
(AAA) (1998): “Criteria for Assessing the Quality of an Accounting Standard”, 
in: Accounting Horizons, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 161-162. 
Asbaugh, Hollis/Olssen, Per (2002): “An Explanatory Study of the Valuation 
Properties of Cross-Listed Firms’ IAS and U.S. GAAP Earnings and Book 
Values”, in: Accounting Review, Vol. 77, pp. 107-127. 
Asbaugh, Hollis/Pincus, Morton (2001): “Domestic Accounting Standards, 
International Accounting Standards, and the Predictability of Earnings”, in: 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 417-434. 
Auer, Kurt V. (1998): „Der Einfluß des Wechsels vom Rechnungslegungsstandard 
auf die Risikoparameter von schweizerischen Aktien“, in: ZfbF 2, pp. 129-155. 
Baiman, Stanley/Verrecchia, Robert E. (1996): “The Relation among Capital 
Markets, Financial Disclosure, Production Efficiency, and Insider Trading”, in: 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 1-22. 
Ball, Ray/Kothari, S.P./Robin, Ashok (2000): “The effect of international 
institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings”, in: Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 1-51. 
Ball, Ray/Robin, Ashok/Wu, Joanna Shuang (2003): “Incentives versus standards: 
properties of accounting income in four East Asian countries”, in: Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 235-270. 
Ballwieser, Wolfgang (1997): „Grenzen des Vergleichs von 
Rechnungslegungssystemen – dargestellt anhand von HGB, U.S. GAAP und 
IAS“, in: Aktien- und Bilanzrecht, (ed.) K. Forster, pp. 371-391.  
Barth, Mary E./Clinch, Greg/Shibano, Toshi (1999): “International Accounting 
Harmonization and Global Equity Markets”, in: Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 201-235. 
Born, Karl (2002): „Rechnungslegung International: Konzernabschlüsse nach IAS, 
US-GAAP, HGB und EG-Richtlinien“, 3. Auflage. 
Botosan, Christine A. (1997): “Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital”, in: 
Accounting Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 323-349. 
Botosan, Christine A./Plumlee, Marlene A. (2002): “A Re-examination of 
Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital”, in: Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 21-40. 
   45  
Breker, Norbert/Naumann, Klaus-Peter/Tielmann, Sandra (1999): „Der 
Wirtschaftsprüfer als Begleiter der Internationalisierung der Rechnungslegung“, 
in: Die Wirtschaftsprüfung, Heft 4/5, pp. 140-154, 185-195. 
Busse von Colbe, Walter (1995): „Zur Anpassung der Rechnungslegung von 
Kapitalgesellschaften an internationale Normen“, in: Zeitschrift für 
betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Heft 4, pp. 373-391. 
Busse von Colbe, Walther (2002): „Entwicklungsperspektiven der 
Rechnungslegung in Deutschland“, in: ZfbF 54, pp. 159-172. 
Chen, Shimin/Sun, Zheng/Wang, Yuetang (2002): “Evidence from China on 
whether harmonized accounting standards harmonize accounting practices”, in: 
Accounting Horizons, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 183-198. 
Clarkson, Pete/Guedes, Jose/Thompson, Rex (1996): “On the Diversification, 
Observability, and Measurement of Estimation Risk”, in: Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, March, pp. 69-84. 
Claus, James/Thomas, Jacob (2001): “Equity Premia as Low as Three Percent? 
Evidence from Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts for Domestic and International 
Stock Markets”, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. LVI, No. 5, pp. 1629-1666. 
Coles, Jeffrey L./Loewenstein, Uri/Suay, Jose (1995): “On Equilibrium Pricing 
under Parameter Uncertainty”, in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 347-364. 
Comprix, Joseph J./Muller III, Karl A./Stanford-Harris, Mary (2002): “Economic 
Consequences from Mandatory Adoption of IASB Standards in the European 
Union”, Working Paper, Penn State University, July 2002. 
Cuijpers, Rick/Buijink, Willem (2003): “Voluntary adoption of non-local GAAP in 
the European Union: a study of determinants and consequences”, Working 
Paper, Universiteit Maastricht, May 2003. 
Daske, Holger/Gebhardt, Günther/Klein, Stefan (2004): “Estimating the Expected 
Cost of Equity Capital Using Consensus Forecasts”, in: Working Paper Series: 
Finance & Accounting, No. 124, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt 
am Main. 
Diamond, Douglas W./Verrecchia, Robert E. (1991): “Disclosure, Liquidity, and 
the Cost of Capital”, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, pp. 1325-1359. 
DRSC: DRS 1 „Befreiender Konzernabschluss nach § 292a HGB“, Berlin 2000. 
Easley, David/O’Hara, Maureen (2004): “Information and the Cost of Capital”, in: 
Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
   46  
Easton, Peter (2003): “Recent research in accounting and finance that has had, and 
will have, a significant effect on the practice of valuation”, Presentation held at 
the Amsterdam-Nyrode Accounting Research Workshop 2003, Amsterdam. 
Easton, Peter (2004): “PE Ratios, PEG Ratios, and Estimating the Implied Expected 
Rate of Return on Equity Capital”, forthcoming in: Accounting Review, Vol. 79, 
No. 1, pp. 73-95. 
Easton, Peter/Harris, Trevor S./Ohlson, James A. (1992): “Aggregate accounting 
earnings can explain most of securities returns”, in: Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 119-143.  
Easton, Peter/Monahan, Steve (2003): “An Evaluation of the Reliability of 
Accounting Based Measures of Expected Returns: A Measurement Error 
Perspective”, Working Paper, University of Chicago, January 2003. 
Easton, Peter/Taylor, Gary/Shroff, Pervin (2001): “Implications of Fading the 
Return-on-Equity to the Industry Median Return-on-Equity”, Working paper, 
Fisher College of Business, 2001. 
Easton, Peter/Taylor, Gary/Shroff, Pervin/Sougiannis, Theodore (2002): “Using 
Forecasts of Earnings to Simultaneously Estimate Growth and the Rate of 
Return on Equity Investment”, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, No. 
3, pp. 657-676. 
Efron, Bradley/Tibshirani, Robert J. (1993): “An Introduction to the Bootstrap”. 
Eller, Roland (2001): “Modernes Bondmanagement”, 2. Auflage. 
Elton, Edwin J. (1999): “Expected Return, Realized Return and Asset Pricing 
Tests”, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. LIV, No. 4, pp. 1199-1220. 
Elton, Edwin J./Gruber, Martin J. (1995): “Modern portfolio theory and investment 
analysis”, 5
th edition. 
EU COM (95) 508 (1995): „Accounting Harmonisation: A New Strategy Vis-à-Vis 
International Harmonisation”. 
Ewert, Ralf (1999): „Rechnungslegung, Globalisierung und Kapitalkosten“, in: 
Zeitschrift für Controlling, Accounting & System-Anwendungen, krp-
Sonderheft 3/99, pp. 39-46. 
Fama, Eugene F./French, Kenneth R. (1992): “The Cross-section of Expected Stock 
Returns”, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 427-465. 
Fama, Eugene F./French, Kenneth R. (1997): “Industry costs of equity”, in: Journal 
of Financial Economics”, Vol. 43, pp. 153-193. 
   47  
Fama, Eugene F./French, Kenneth R. (2003): “The CAPM: Theory and Evidence”, 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) University of Chicago Working 
Paper No. 550, August 2003. 
Fama, Eugene F./McBeth, J. (1973): “Risk, return and equilibrium: empirical tests”, 
in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 81, pp. 607-636. 
Francis, Jennifer/LaFond, Ryan/Olsson, Per/Schipper, Katherine (2003): “Cost of 
Capital and Earnings Attributes”, Working Paper, Duke University, May 2003. 
Francis, Jennifer/Olsson, Per/Oswald, Dennis R. (2000): “Comparing the Accuracy 
and Explainability of Dividend, Free Cash Flow, and Abnormal Earnings Equity 
Estimates”, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 45-70. 
Frankel, Richard/Lee, Charles M.C. (1998): “Accounting valuation, market 
expectation, and cross-sectional stock returns”, in: Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 283-319. 
GAAP Convergence (2002): “A Survey of National Efforts to Promote and Achieve 
Convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards”, (eds.) BDO, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Gebhardt, Günther (2000): “The Evolution of Global Standards in Accounting”, in: 
(eds.) Robert E. Litan and Anthony M. Santomero, Brookings-Wharton Papers 
on Financial Services 2000, pp. 341-376. 
Gebhardt, Günther/Heilmann, Aaron A. (2004): “Enforcement of German and 
International Accounting Standards in Germany: The Case of Cash Flow 
Statements”, in: The Economics and Politics of Accounting, in: (eds.) Anthony 
Hopwood, Christian Leuz, and Dieter Pfaff, pp. 218-238. 
Gebhardt, William R./Lee, Charles M.C./Swaminathan, Bhaskaran (2001): “Toward 
an Implied Cost of Capital”, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 39, No. 1, 
pp. 135-176. 
Glaum, Martien/Street, Donna L. (2002): “Rechnungslegung der Unternehmen am 
Neuen Markt – Die Einhaltung der Ausweispflichten nach IAS und US-GAAP,” 
in: (eds.) R. von Rosen, Studien des Deutschen Aktieninstituts. 
Gode, Dan/Mohanram, Partha (2002): “Inferring the Cost of Capital Using the 
Ohlson-Juettner Model”, Working paper, New York University, December 
2002. 
Gordon, Joseph R./Gordon, Myron J. (1997): “The Finite Horizon Expected Return 
Model”, in: Financial Analysts Journal, May/June, pp. 52-60. 
   48  
Guay, Wayne/Kothari, S.P./Shu, Susan (2003): “Properties of Implied Cost of 
Capital Using Analysts’ Forecasts”, Working Paper 4422-03, MIT Sloan School 
of Management, July 2003. 
Gujarati, Damodar N. (2003): Basic econometrics, 4
th edition. 
Hail, Luzi (2002): “The Impact of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure on the Ex ante 
Cost of Capital for Swiss Firms”, in: European Accounting Review, Vol. 11, No. 
4, pp. 741-773.  
Hail, Luzi/Leuz, Christian (2003): “International Differences in Cost of Capital: Do 
Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?”, Working Paper, The 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
Harris, Mary S./Muller III, Karl A. (1999): “The market valuation of IAS versus 
US-GAAP accounting measures using Form 20-F reconciliations”, in: Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 285-312. 
Harris, Trevor S./Lang, Mark/Möller, Hans Peter (1994): “The Value Relevance of 
German Accounting Measures: An Empirical Analysis”, in: Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 187-209. 
Hayn, Sven/Graf Waldersee, Georg (2002): „IAS / US-GAAP / HGB im Vergleich: 
Systematische Darstellung für den Einzel- und Konzernabschluss“, 3. Auflage. 
Illingworth, David (2003): “World economy needs IAS”, on: 
www.accountancyage.com/Print/1134927, September 18, 2003. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (2002a): International 
Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Annual Report 2002. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (2002b): IASB Insight, October 
2002. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (2002c): IASB Insight, July 2002. 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (IASCF) (2002): 
Constitution, July 2002. 
Joos, Peter (2000): “Discussion of The Economic Consequences of Increased 
Disclosure”, Vol. 38 (Supplement), pp. 125-136. 
Joos, Peter/Lang, Mark (1994): “The Effects of Accounting Diversity: Evidence 
from the European Union”, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32 
(Supplement), pp. 141-168. 
Kleekämper, Heinz (1995): „Aktuelle Entwicklungen beim IASC“, Zeitschrift für 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Heft 4, pp. 41-65. 
   49  
Köhler, Annette G./Marten, Kai-Uwe/Schlereth, Dieter/Crampton, Adrian (2003): 
„Praxisbefragung: Erfahrungen von Unternehmen bei der Umstellung der 
Rechnungslegung von HGB auf IAS/IFRS oder US-GAAP“, in: Betriebs-
Berater, 58. Jg., Heft 49. 
Lang, Mark H./Lundholm, Russell J. (1996): “Corporate Disclosure Policy and 
Analyst Behaviour”, in: Accounting Review, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 467-492. 
Lee, Charles, M.C./Myers, James (1999): “What is the intrinsic value of the 
Dow ?”, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 5, pp. 1693-1742. 
Leuz, Christian (2003): “IAS versus US GAAP: Information Asymmetry-Based 
Evidence from Germany’s New Market”, in: Journal of Accounting Research, 
Vol. 41, No. 3 (June), pp. 445-472. 
Leuz, Christian/Nanda, Dhananjay/Wysocki, Peter D. (2003): “Earnings 
management and investor protection: an international comparison”, in: Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 505-527. 
Leuz, Christian/Verrecchia, Robert E. (2000): “The Economic Consequences of 
Increased Disclosure”, in: Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38 
(Supplement), pp. 91-124. 
Leuz, Christian/Verrecchia, Robert E. (2004): “Firms’ Capital Allocation Choices, 
Information Quality, and the Cost of Capital”, Working Paper, The Wharton 
School, January 2004. 
Leuz, Christian/Wüstemann, Jens (2003): “The Role of Accounting in the German 
Financial System”, Working Paper, No. 2003/16, Center for Financial Studies, 
Frankfurt/M. 
Levitt, Arthur (1998): “The Importance of High Quality Accounting Standards”, in: 
Accounting Horizons, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 79-82. 
Lewellen, Jonathan/Shanken, Jay (2002): “Learning, asset pricing tests, and market 
efficiency”, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 1113-1145. 
Malkiel, Burton G./Xu, Yexiao (1997): “Risk and Return Revisited”, in: Journal of 
Portfolio Management, Vol. 23 (Spring), pp. 9-14. 
Marten, Kai-Uwe/Schlereth, Dieter/Crampton, Adrian/Köhler, Annette G. (2002): 
„Rechnungslegung nach IAS – Nutzeneffekte aus Sicht von 
Eigenkapitalgebern“, in: Betriebs-Berater, 57. Jg., Heft 39, 25. September 2002. 
McKinsey (2002): “Global Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate Governance”. 
Mehra, Rajnish (2002): “The Equity Premium: Why Is It a Puzzle?”, in: Financial 
Analysts Journal, Jan/Feb 2003, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 54-60. 
   50  
Modigliani, Franco/Miller, Merton (1958): “The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance, and the Theory of Investment”, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 
XLVIII, No. 3, pp. 261-297. 
Ohlson, James/Juettner-Nauroth, Beate E. (2000): “Expected EPS and EPS Growth 
as Determinants of Value”, Working paper, New York University, September 
2000. 
Pellens, Bernhard./Tomaszewski, Claude (1999): “Kapitalmarktreaktionen auf den 
Rechnungslegungswechsel zu IAS bzw. US-GAAP“, in: Rechnungswesen und 
Kapitalmarkt, (eds.) Günther Gebhardt und Bernhard Pellens, ZfbF Sonderheft 
41, pp. 199-228. 
Penman, Stephen H./Sougiannis, Theodore (1998): “A Comparison of Dividend, 
Cash Flow, and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation”, in: Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 343-383. 
Pownell, Grace/Schipper, Kathrine (1999): “Implications of Accounting Research 
for the SEC’s Consideration of International Accounting Standards for U.S. 
Securities Offerings”, in: Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13, pp. 259-280. 
Radebaugh, Lee H./Gebhardt, Günther/Gray, Sidney J. (1995): “Foreign Stock 
Exchange Listings: A Case Study of Daimler-Benz”, in: Journal of International 
Financial Management and Accounting, pp. 158-192. 
Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
July 19, 2002 on the application of international accounting standards, O. J. No. 
L 243, September 9, 2002. 
Richardson, Alan J./Welker, Michael (2001): “Social disclosure, financial 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital”, in: Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, Vol. 26, pp. 597-616. 
Schildbach, Thomas (2004): „Rechnungslegung im Spannungsfeld zweier Kulturen 
der Regulierung“, in: Der Schweizer Treuhänder, 3/04, pp. 159-172. 
Schipper, Kathrine (2000): “Accounting Research and the Potential Use of 
International Accounting Standards for Cross-Border Listings”, in: British 
Accounting Review, Vol. 32, pp. 243-256. 
Schrand, Catherine/Verrecchia, Robert E. (2002): “Disclosure Choice and Cost of 
Capital: Evidence from Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings”, Working 
Paper, The Wharton School, December 2002. 
Sengupta, Partha (1998): “Corporate Disclosure Quality”, in: Accounting Review, 
Vol. 73, pp. 459-474. 
   51  
Spanheimer, Jürgen (2002): „Internationale Rechnungslegung: Hintergründe, 
Entwicklungstendenzen, Folgewirkungen“. 
Stahl, Anne B. (2002): „Wechsel von HGB auf IAS oder US-GAAP – 
Untersuchung der Motive und der organisatorischen Umsetzung in der Praxis“, 
in: Zeitschrift für Controlling, Accounting & System-Anwendungen, krp-
Kostenrechnungspraxis, 46. Jg., Heft 1, pp. 33-36. 
Steiner, Manfred/Bruns, Christian (2000): „Wertpapiermanagement“, 7. Auflage. 
Stulz, René M. (1999): “Globalization, corporate finance, and the cost of capital”, 
in: Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 8-25. 
The IASC-U.S. Comparison Project (1999): “A Report on the Similarities and 
Differences between IASC Standards and U.S. GAAP”, Financial Accounting 
Standards Board. 
Thomson Financial (2003): Glossary I/B/E/S Summary History – Version 2.0. 
Van Hulle, Karel (2003): „Von den Bilanzrichtlinien zu International Accounting 
Standards“, in: Die Wirtschaftsprüfung, Heft 18/2003. 
Verrecchia, Robert E. (2001): “Essays on disclosure”, in: Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 91-180. 
Wagenhofer, Alfred (2003): „Internationale Rechnungslegungsstandards - 
IAS/IFRS“, 4. Auflage. 
Zhang, Xiao-Jun (2000): “Conservative accounting and equity valuation”, in: 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 125-149. 
 
   52  
TABLE 1 
The Process towards Internationalization of Financial Reporting in Germany 
 
                      Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
  N  %                    N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
HGB                            206 99.52% 221 97.79% 224 95.73% 199 94.31% 296 93.08% 268 82.72% 174 49.71% 114 29.77% 99 21.81% 68 22.15%
IAS/IFRS                           
                           
                           
1 0.48% 4 2.21% 9 3.85% 8 3.79% 15 4.72% 34 10.49% 108 30.86% 144 37.60% 183 40.31% 121 39.41%
US-GAAP 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.43% 4 1.90% 7 2.20% 22 6.79% 68 19.43% 125 32.64% 172 37.89% 118 38.44%
All 207 100% 226 100% 234 100% 211 100% 318 100% 324 100% 350 100% 383 100% 454 100% 307 100%
This table presents the number of listed firms in Germany reporting under local GAAP (HGB), IAS/IFRS, and US-GAAP from 1993 to 2002. The total number of observations is 
determined by pooling all available firms from Datastream, Worldscope and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. For each firm-year observation, the accounting standards applied as 
described in the auditor’s statement of the financial reports is selected. The full set of firms are listed in Panel A, while only the firms used in this study after sample selection 
procedures are in Panel B.        
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TABLE 2 
Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Input Variable  Symbol  Description in Database 
Forecasted EPS  fepst+n   I/B/E/S Median EPS Estimate for periods 1 to 5 
RIV-Long term growth LTG  g
ltg I/B/E/S  Long Term Growth 
Book value of equity (BVE)  BVt WORLDSCOPE  Total Common Equity 
No. of shares outstanding    I/B/E/S Shares Outstanding (in Mio.) 
BVE per share  bvpsn  Total Common Equity/ Shares Outstanding 
Payout ratio  k  WORLDSCOPE Div Payout Ratio 
Share price  pt  I/B/E/S Price 
Target-ROE    Median of Industry ROE over the past 5 years 
OJN-Short-term growth rate  g2  Average growth of earnings from t+1 to t+2 and I/B/E/S growth rate 
OJN-Long-term growth rate  γ  Inflation rate, proxy as risk free rate of return minus 3% (rf – 3%) 
Industry   WORLDSCOPE  SIC Code 
Estimation Date  t  Estimation date, one per month 
Risk free rate of return  r
f DATASTREAM  REX BOND SUB INDEX CURRENT,10 YRS – R.Y. 
This table presents the definitions, symbols and data sources of the input variables used to estimate the expected cost of 
equity capial under the estimation procedures. Data comes from I/B/E/S, Datastream and Worldscope. 
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TABLE 3 
Sample Selection 
Description No.  Percent 
I/B/E/S dataset  69,785 100.00% 
Shares outstanding data missing  (594)  0.85% 
Share price data missing  (690)  0.99% 
Accounting data missing  (10,019)  14.36% 
Target ROE data missing  (814)  1.17% 
At least three future EPS-estimators or two future EPS-estimates and LTG  (24,963)  35.77% 
Stacked forecasts  (3,295)  4.72% 
Insolvency estimates  (517)  0.74% 
Data before 1993  (4,062)  5.82% 
Missing information on type of Reporting Standards applied  (472)  0.67% 
Final dataset (735 firms)  24,359  34.91% 
HGB (377 full reporting and 76 pre-switch firms)  16,250  65.44% 
IAS/IFRS (155 full reporting and 52 post-switch firms)  4,567  18.39% 
US-GAAP (127 full reporting and 24 post-switch firms)  3,542  14.26% 
This table presents sample selection procedures. Data comes from I/B/E/S, Datastream and Worldscope. Information on 
the accounting standards applied comes from the auditor’s statement of the annual reports. Full reporting firms are firms 
which entirely reported under one set of financial reporting standards. Switch firms are firms which adopted 
international standards during the investigation period 1993-2002. Pre-switch means firms with available local GAAP 
(HGB) observations before the switch. Post-switch means firms with available IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP observations 
after the switch. 
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TABLE 4 
Expected Cost of Equtiy Capital Estimates 
Panel A: Results pooled across all years in Germany 
Variable  N  Mean  Median   StDev   Min  Q1  Q3  Max 
Panel A1: All Firms 
Total               
rRIV 24,359  11.44% 9.92% 6.12% 0.95%  7.38%  13.66%  53.79% 
rOJN 19,973  11.72% 10.79% 4.80% 2.48%  8.64%  13.68%  78.19% 
HGB            
rRIV 16,250  9.85% 9.12% 4.24% 2.04%  6.96%  11.79%  49.13% 
rOJN 14,006  11.10% 10.50% 3.90% 3.28%  8.44%  13.09%  42.38% 
IAS/IFRS            
rRIV 4,567  14.34%
*** 12.46%
*** 7.57%  0.95%  8.87% 18.13%  44.19% 
rOJN 3,516  13.21%
*** 11.68%
*** 5.79%  2.95%  9.23% 15.53%  50.05% 
US-GAAP               
rRIV 3,542  14.99%
*** 13.43%
*** 8.11%  1.06%  8.96% 19.27%  53.79% 
rOJN 2,451  13.13%
*** 11.64%
*** 6.75%  2.48%  8.95% 15.16%  78.19% 
Panel A2: Switch Firms 
Total               
rRIV 6,459  9.30% 8.59% 3.76% 1.41%  6.69%  11.02%  35.64% 
rOJN 6,015  10.69% 10.00% 3.61% 2.95%  8.31%  12.41%  42.10% 
HGB            
rRIV 4,064  8.56% 7.85% 3.26% 2.20%  6.43%  9.96%  28.37% 
rOJN 3,740  10.34% 9.90% 3.16% 3.36%  8.16%  12.13%  23.83% 
IAS/IFRS            
rRIV 1,564  10.27%
*** 9.62%
*** 4.06%  3.16%  7.36% 12.19%  30.12% 
rOJN 1,479  10.97%
*** 10.07%
*** 3.70%  2.95%  8.49% 12.56%  33.15% 
US-GAAP               
rRIV 831  11.06%
*** 10.14%
*** 4.35%  1.41%  8.05% 13.58%  35.64% 
rOJN 796  11.79%
*** 10.44%
*** 4.91%  4.35%  8.61% 13.48%  42.10% 
 
Panel B: Results for individual years in Germany 
Year 1993  1994 1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Panel A1: Average Expected Cost of Capital 
rRIV  7.75% 7.53% 8.40%  9.04% 8.85%  9.79%  11.49%  11.53%  15.39%  17.12% 
rOJN 9.22%  10.14%  11.49%  10.70%  10.39%  10.42% 11.17% 11.44% 14.50% 15.28% 
Panel A2: Average Market Risk Premium 
rpRIV  1.48% 1.02% 1.93%  3.44% 3.73%  5.40% 7.28% 6.31%  10.81%  12.58% 
rpOJN  2.98% 3.59% 5.03%  5.12% 5.27%  6.05% 6.96% 6.22% 9.91%  10.76% 
*** Mean (median) difference in expected cost of equity capital between local GAAP (HGB) and IAS/IFRS or US-
GAAP is significant at the 1% level using t-test (Wilcoxon rank sum-test), two-tail. Results are for a sample of German 
firms from 1993-2002 utilizing data from I/B/E/S, Datastream and Worldscope to estimate the expected cost of equity 
capital under the residual income valuation model (rRIV) and the Ohlson/Jüttner-Nauroth (2001) model (rOJN) assuming 
long-term growth. The “All Firms” sample comprises all observations, the “Switch Firms” sample only observations 
from firms which have switched from local to international standards during the investigation period. Auditor’s 
statements in the financial reports classify firms according to the reporting standards applied. The average expected cost 
of equity capital (market risk premium) is the yearly equally weighted average of all firms in the sample. Market risk 
premium is calculated by deducting from the expected cost of equity capital the risk free-rate of return (REX-Index 
return). When regressing expected cost of equity capital (rRIV, rOJN) or risk premium (rpRIV, rpOJN) on a time count 
variable, its’ coefficients always show to be positive and highly significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
Panel A1: All Firms 
 Reporting  N  Mean  Median  StDev  Min  Q1  Q3  Max 
Rex  All 24,359  5.10%  5.02%  0.87%  3.49%  4.59%  5.48%  7.36% 
 HGB  16,494  5.29%  5.20%  0.96%  3.49%  4.65%  5.99%  7.36% 
 IAS/IFRS  4,644  4.73%  4.75%  0.47%  3.49%  4.50%  5.03%  7.06% 
 US-GAAP  3,594  4.70%  4.72%  0.44%  3.49%  4.50%  5.03%  5.99% 
Beta  All 16,111  0.953  0.877  0.613  -0.391  0.553  1.196  6.281 
 HGB  11,739  0.830  0.832  0.400  -0.170  0.527  1.101  2.304 
 IAS/IFRS  2,539  1.167  1.008  0.789  -0.391  0.616  1.604  4.212 
 US-GAAP  1,833  1.443  1.157  1.010  -0.210  0.741  2.014  6.281 
Vola  All 18,751  0.289  0.222  0.264  0.000  0.083  0.382  1.745 
 HGB  12,386  0.215  0.199  0.158  0.019  0.069  0.322  1.239 
 IAS/IFRS  3,583  0.400  0.279  0.335  0.000  0.126  0.649  1.745 
 US-GAAP  2,782  0.480  0.369  0.371  0.018  0.150  0.786  1.644 
DM All  24,359  2.879  1.139  5.336  -0.207  0.396  2.745  100.295 
 HGB  16,250  3.430  1.557  5.679  0.017  0.685  3.355  100.295 
 IAS/IFRS  4,568  2.477  0.553  5.536  -0.105  0.122  1.979  69.893 
 US-GAAP  3,545  0.870  0.271  1.640  -0.207  0.080  0.934  20.816 
No.  All 24,359  14.278  11.000  11.775  1.000  4.000  23.000  49.000 
 HGB  16,447  15.578  13.000  11.757  1.000  5.000  25.000  47.000 
 IAS/IFRS  4,624  11.763  6.000  11.474  1.000  3.000  19.000  48.000 
 US-GAAP  3,576  11.553  6.000  11.242  1.000  3.000  17.000  49.000 
Ln_size  All 24,359  5.852  5.598  1.913  0.789  4.486  7.142  11.766 
 HGB  16,250  5.905  5.670  1.687  1.058  4.693  7.115  10.869 
 IAS/IFRS  4,567  5.698  5.375  2.273  0.789  3.949  7.335  11.408 
 US-GAAP  3,542  5.809  5.545  2.327  1.318  4.022  7.104  11.766 
BM All  24,359  0.827  0.557  1.009  0.001  0.325  0.952  21.289 
 HGB  16,250  0.796  0.578  0.783  0.024  0.370  0.916  12.338 
 IAS/IFRS  4,567  0.987  0.511  1.601  0.001  0.215  1.106  21.289 
 US-GAAP  3,542  0.765  0.486  0.919  0.001  0.147  0.990  7.464 
RP_Lag  All 24,359  5.15%  4.19%  4.31%  -3.30%  2.03%  7.65%  19.89% 
 HGB  16,493  3.52%  3.08%  3.09%  -3.30%  1.36%  5.35%  16.93% 
 IAS/IFRS  4,648  7.91%  7.65%  4.62%  0.74%  3.90%  10.51%  19.89% 
 US-GAAP  3,595  9.09%  9.33%  4.33%  1.37%  6.34%  11.45%  19.89% 
Time  All 24,359  69.635  75.000  33.473  1.000  43.000  98.000  120.000 
 HGB  16,572  55.183  56.000  30.428  1.000  30.000  78.000  120.000 
 IAS/IFRS  4,653  97.523  101.000  17.189  27.000  89.000  110.000  120.000 
 US-GAAP  3,606  100.067  102.000  13.771  40.000  93.000  111.000  120.000 
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Panel A2: Switch Firms 
 Reporting  N  Mean  Median  StDev  Min  Q1  Q3  Max 
Rex  All 6,459  5.13%  5.06%  0.88%  3.49%  4.60%  5.52%  7.36% 
 HGB  4,112  5.37%  5.26%  0.97%  3.49%  4.68%  6.00%  7.36% 
 IAS/IFRS  1,579  4.77%  4.82%  0.54%  3.49%  4.50%  5.20%  7.06% 
 US-GAAP  839  4.65%  4.68%  0.45%  3.49%  4.30%  4.94%  5.99% 
Beta  All 6,459  0.895  0.884  0.423  -0.391  0.621  1.138  3.259 
 HGB  3,058  0.940  0.938  0.384  -0.118  0.687  1.195  2.280 
 IAS/IFRS  1,243  0.768  0.770  0.459  -0.391  0.439  1.008  3.259 
 US-GAAP  710  0.921  0.827  0.474  0.017  0.639  1.088  2.957 
Vola  All 5,242  0.202  0.158  0.163  0.014  0.066  0.319  1.450 
 HGB  3,236  0.184  0.157  0.142  0.019  0.058  0.284  0.644 
 IAS/IFRS  1,269  0.230  0.157  0.192  0.014  0.070  0.364  1.450 
 US-GAAP  737  0.237  0.172  0.183  0.024  0.083  0.374  1.014 
DM All  6,395  4.096  1.829  6.232  0.000  0.872  3.733  69.893 
 HGB  4,033  4.139  1.908  5.966  0.028  1.061  3.760  47.827 
 IAS/IFRS  1,544  5.119  1.975  7.791  0.003  0.685  5.416  69.893 
 US-GAAP  818  1.948  1.064  2.651  0.000  0.453  2.357  20.816 
No.  All 6,373  25.652  28.000  11.006  1.000  18.000  34.000  48.000 
 HGB  4,000  26.486  29.000  10.872  1.000  19.000  35.000  47.000 
 IAS/IFRS  1,551  24.215  26.000  10.753  1.000  16.000  32.000  48.000 
 US-GAAP  822  24.305  27.000  11.701  1.000  15.000  34.000  44.000 
Ln_size  All 6,348  7.589  7.753  1.787  1.295  6.224  8.960  11.419 
 HGB  3,984  7.392  7.562  1.624  2.584  6.165  8.669  10.869 
 IAS/IFRS  1,533  7.843  8.188  1.879  1.295  6.459  9.267  11.408 
 US-GAAP  831  8.065  8.110  2.171  2.238  6.338  10.124  11.419 
BM All  6,443  0.691  0.544  0.684  0.013  0.357  0.811  12.338 
 HGB  4,034  0.644  0.538  0.582  0.029  0.353  0.782  12.338 
 IAS/IFRS  1,570  0.822  0.544  0.943  0.018  0.386  0.934  10.058 
 US-GAAP  839  0.670  0.604  0.512  0.013  0.349  0.860  4.231 
RP_Lag  All 6,459  3.90%  3.39%  3.21%  -3.30%  1.38%  6.22%  16.93% 
 HGB  4,101  2.87%  2.23%  2.86%  -3.30%  0.89%  4.73%  11.45% 
 IAS/IFRS  1,580  5.17%  4.73%  2.88%  0.74%  2.91%  7.65%  16.93% 
 US-GAAP  830  6.63%  6.61%  2.97%  1.37%  4.11%  8.67%  16.93% 
Time  All 6,459  65.901  69.000  32.739  1.000  40.000  93.000  120.000 
 HGB  4,116  50.175  51.000  27.771  1.000  27.000  72.000  113.000 
 IAS/IFRS  1,580  89.712  94.000  22.405  27.000  78.000  108.000  120.000 
 US-GAAP  841  98.131  102.000  17.321  40.000  89.000  111.000  120.000 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the control variables of a sample of German firms from 1993-2002: Rex is the 
proxy for the risk-free rate of return measured by the REX-Index return (Datastream); Beta is the five year rolling over 
beta against the CDAX-Market Index using monthly returns (Datastream); Vola is the standard deviation of the 
previous years daily returns, measured over 250 trading days (Datastream); DM is the ratio of long-term debt to market 
capitalization (Worldscope, Datastream); No. is the number of analyst following (I/B/E/S); Ln_size is the natural log of 
firm size in millions € (I/B/E/S); BM is the book to market ratio of equity (Worldscope, I/B/E/S); RP_Lag is the 
previous years risk premium of the firm’s industry (Own calculation); Time is a monthly count variable ranging from 
January 1993 (=1) to December 2002 (=120); IAS/IFRS is a dummy variable, 1 if IAS/IFRS, 0 otherwise (Annual 
report); US-GAAP Dummy variable, 1 if US-GAAP, 0 otherwise (Annual report). The “All Firms” sample comprises 
all observations, the “Switch Firms” sample only observations from firms which have switched from local to 
international standards during the investigation period. 
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TABLE 6 
Correlations of Variables 
Panel A1: All Firms 
  rRIV r                     OJN Rex Beta Vola DM No. ln_size BM RP_Lag  Time IAS/IFRS  US-GAAP
rRIV                            1.000 0.692 -0.322 0.293 0.372 0.021 -0.367 -0.565 0.568 0.631 0.488 0.227 0.239
rOJN                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                         
                           
                         
                           
                           
0.603 1.000 -0.148 0.173 0.214 0.033 -0.260 -0.413 0.387 0.323 0.313 0.143 0.109
Rex -0.373 -0.145 1.000 -0.039 -0.237 0.016 0.220 0.095 -0.135 -0.452 -0.723 -0.205 -0.190
Beta 0.113 0.096 0.029 1.000 0.378 -0.047 0.046 -0.115 0.123 0.223 0.135 0.151 0.286
Vola 0.273 0.148 -0.244 0.202 1.000 -0.042 -0.252 -0.280 0.159 0.361 0.372 0.203 0.301
DM 0.060 0.117 0.079 0.015 -0.116 1.000 0.076 0.100 0.279 -0.190 -0.059 -0.036 -0.155
No. -0.376 -0.254 0.208 0.172 -0.198 0.210 1.000 0.711 -0.158 -0.341 -0.314 -0.103 -0.095
ln_size
 
-0.586 -0.426 0.130 -0.022 -0.255 0.026 0.683 1.000 -0.406 -0.327 -0.143 -0.039 -0.009
BM 0.530 0.352 -0.087 0.020 0.060 0.552 -0.069 -0.421 1.000 0.190 0.172 0.076 -0.025
RP_Lag
 
0.643 0.308 -0.497 0.036 0.328 -0.313 -0.342 -0.318 0.070 1.000 0.708 0.308 0.377
Time 0.515 0.294 -0.675 0.019 0.331 -0.210 -0.317 -0.171 0.086 0.746 1.000 0.400 0.375
IAS/IFRS 0.205 0.118 -0.201 0.115 0.158 -0.175 -0.117 -0.051 -0.041 0.295 0.415 1.000 -0.198
US-GAAP 0.204 0.072 -0.191 0.177 0.217 -0.309 -0.096 -0.031 -0.082 0.363 0.391 -0.198 1.000
 
Panel A2: Switch Firms 
  rRIV r                     OJN Rex Beta Vola DM No. ln_size BM RP_Lag  Time IAS/IFRS  US-GAAP
rRIV                            1.000 0.630 -0.257 -0.008 0.156 0.004 -0.354 -0.496 0.653 0.584 0.398 0.147 0.181
rOJN                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                         
                           
                         
                           
                           
0.567 1.000 -0.027 0.044 0.117 0.070 -0.209 -0.335 0.365 0.316 0.221 0.045 0.119
Rex -0.258 -0.016 1.000 0.124 -0.226 0.031 0.273 0.008 -0.065 -0.469 -0.718 -0.229 -0.207
Beta -0.048 0.062 0.137 1.000 0.201 0.000 0.279 0.065 0.008 -0.093 -0.216 -0.172 0.025
Vola 0.083 0.068 -0.233 0.112 1.000 0.129 -0.112 -0.054 0.089 0.208 0.266 0.096 0.086
DM 0.079 0.198 0.069 0.143 0.027 1.000 -0.003 0.115 0.255 -0.235 0.000 0.093 -0.132
No. -0.301 -0.106 0.273 0.359 -0.107 0.047 1.000 0.678 -0.219 -0.343 -0.340 -0.074 -0.047
ln_size
 
-0.410 -0.264 -0.010 0.136 0.011 0.043 0.657 1.000 -0.372 -0.244 -0.011 0.080 0.103
BM 0.615 0.429 0.031 -0.013 -0.015 0.523 -0.118 -0.288 1.000 0.199 0.154 0.109 -0.012
RP_Lag
 
0.601 0.280 -0.488 -0.152 0.222 -0.242 -0.345 -0.232 0.142 1.000 0.696 0.223 0.324
Time 0.392 0.179 -0.697 -0.273 0.265 -0.022 -0.354 0.008 0.086 0.708 1.000 0.411 0.378
IAS/IFRS 0.151 0.035 -0.222 -0.189 0.083 0.028 -0.084 0.094 0.046 0.239 0.418 1.000 -0.217
0 US-GAAP 0.182 0.071 -0.223 -0.016 0.092 -0.172 -0.038 0.103 0.010 0.312 0.391 -0.217 1.00
   59  
This table shows parametric Pearson correlations (upper right triangle) and non-parametric Spearman correlations (lower left triangle) for two expected cost of equity capital 
estimates and eleven independent variables: rRIV are the expected cost of equity capital estimated under the residual income valuation model assuming long-term growth; rOJN are 
the expected cost of equity capital estimated under the Ohlson/Jüttner-Nauroth (2001) model assuming long-term growth. Rex is the proxy for the risk-free rate of return 
measured by the REX-Index return (Datastream); Beta is the five year rolling over beta against the CDAX-Market Index using monthly returns (Datastream); Vola is the 
standard deviation of the previous years daily returns, measured over 250 trading days (Datastream); DM is the ratio of long-term debt to market capitalization (Worldscope, 
Datastream); No. is the number of analyst following (I/B/E/S); Ln_size is the natural log of firm size in millions € (I/B/E/S); BM is the book to market ratio of equity 
(Worldscope, I/B/E/S); RP_Lag is the previous years risk premium of the firm’s industry (Own calculation); Time is a monthly count variable ranging from January 1993 (=1) to 
December 2002 (=120); IAS/IFRS is a dummy variable, 1 if IAS/IFRS, 0 otherwise (Annual report); US-GAAP Dummy variable, 1 if US-GAAP, 0 otherwise (Annual report). 
The “All Firms” sample comprises all observations, the “Switch Firms” sample only observations of firms which have switched from local to international standards during the 
investigation period. 
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TABLE 7 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Risk Premium, Firm Characteristics and Financial Reporting 
Panel A: All Firms 
A Beta  ln_size  BM  Vola  No.  DM  RP_Lag  time  IAS/IFRS  US-GAAP F-Stats  (Adj)-R2
Hypothesis                            O + - + + - + + o - -
Panel A1: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression 
(1a)           rpRIV  0.0055   0.0096   -0.0079   0.0220 0.5117   0.0038   0.0036   0.0082   6140.96
***  73.70 % 





***  1.27  1.91
*     
rpOJN 
 









*** 0.99  9.12
***  2.42






















*** 58.31  %
 
*** *** *** 
*** 
*** 
***      
rpOJN 
 
0.0096   0.0152 0.0134   -0.0009   0.0010   0.2945   0.0031   0.0037   -0.0004   644.23
 
***  29.11 % 
1.31  4.53




***  0.85  -0.08    
Panel A2: Standardized Monthly Cross-Sectional Regressions (Fama-McBeth 1973) 
(1b)              rpRIV  0.0000   0.1097   -0.2507   0.4749 0.3424 0.0673   0.0404   46.17
***  64.08 % 




*** 1.15  0.69     
rpOJN 
 










** 1.22 0.78  0.48  
(2b) rpRIV  0.0000   0.1071 0.0316   -0.2327   0.1966   0.5281 0.0301   0.0232   15.14
 
***  40.28 % 
   0.57  1.33 0.34   -3.08
***  2.82
***  7.15
*** 0.36   0.24   
 rpOJN 
 






*** 1.54 0.22   -2.43
**  1.21  2.45
** 0.42   0.15  
     
          
          
          
            
          
        
            
2640.24
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Panel B: Switch Firms 
  A                    Beta ln_size BM Vola No. DM RP_Lag time IAS/IFRS  US-GAAP F-Stats Adj-R
2 
Hypothesis                            O + - + + - + + o - -
Panel B1: Pooled Cross-Sectional Regression 
(1c)          rpRIV  0.0006   0.0065   -0.0048   0.0341 0.4658   0.0023   0.0020   0.0064   1504.01
***  68.74 % 
   0.05  1.42  -4.44
*** 9.58
***       
         
         
            
        
        
              
8.44
***  3.19
***  0.55  1.19     
rpOJN 
 








*** 1.52  3.61










1.12  1.33 0.40  -4.21
***  1.15  6.80
***  1.16  0.11  0.26   
rpOJN 
 
0.0258   0.0120 0.0056   -0.0006   0.0007   0.3683   0.0013   0.0018   0.0014   172.78
 
***  24.26 % 
1.84
*  1.55 0.32  -2.70
***  3.06
***  3.28
***  1.18  0.45  0.20    
Panel B2: Standardized Monthly Cross-Sectional Regressions (Fama-McBeth 1973) 
(1d)              rpRIV  0.0000   0.0876   -0.1770   0.4956 0.4113 0.0799   0.0402   17.30
***  62.17 % 
   0.65  0.84  -1.83
*  4.92
***               
             
                   
           
                 
          
                   
3.64
*** 0.80  0.43     
rpOJN 
 








0.98 0.38  0.11  
(2d) rpRIV  0.0000   0.0908 0.0523   -0.1668   0.0883   0.5181 0.0490   -0.0088   5.26
 
***  36.18 % 
   0.76  0.54 0.36   -1.33  0.70  3.60
*** 0.35   -0.10   
 rpOJN 
 





1.52  0.79 0.04   -0.71  0.85   1.66
* 0.15   -0.12  
***, 
**, 
* Significantly different from zero at significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. This table shows regression results for a sample of German firms from 1993-2002 using data 
from I/B/E/S, Datastream, Worldscope and the annual reports. The dependent variables are the expected risk premia estimated under the residual income valuation model (rRIV) or 
the Ohlson/Jüttner-Nauroth (2001) model (rOJN) assuming long-term growth. The independent variables are the following: Rex is the proxy for the risk-free rate of return 
measured by the REX-Index return (Datastream); Beta is the five year rolling over beta against the CDAX-Market Index using monthly returns (Datastream); Vola is the 
standard deviation of the previous years daily returns, measured over 250 trading days (Datastream); DM is the ratio of long-term debt to market capitalization (Worldscope, 
Datastream); No. is the number of analyst following (I/B/E/S); Ln_size is the natural log of firm size in millions € (I/B/E/S); BM is the book to market ratio of equity 
(Worldscope, I/B/E/S); RP_Lag is the previous years risk premium of the firm’s industry (Own calculation); Time is a monthly count variable ranging from January 1993 (=1) to 
December 2002 (=120); IAS/IFRS is a dummy variable, 1 if IAS/IFRS, 0 otherwise (Annual report); US-GAAP Dummy variable, 1 if US-GAAP, 0 otherwise (Annual report). 
All regression variables are winzorized to the 1
st and 99
th percentile values. The “All Firms” sample in Panel A comprises all observations, the “Switch Firms” sample in Panel B 
only observations of firms which have switched from local to international standards during the investigation period. 
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TABLE 8 
Time-Series Analysis of Expected Risk Premia Before and After the Switch to 
International Financial Reporting 
     Absolute Risk Premium  Relative Risk Premium 
  N  Mean Median Mean  Median
  rpRI rpOJN r pRIV r pOJN rpRIV rpOJN rrpRIV rrpOJN r rpRIV rrpOJN
Panel A: HGB to IAS/IFRS 
t – 1  49  49  4.22%  5.48 % 3.78% 5.29% -2.40% -1.38 %  -2.64% -1.71%
t + 1  49  49  5.45%  6.49 % 4.91% 4.98% -2.26% -1.05 %  -2.99% -1.23%
Diff. ∆   1.23%  1.01 % 1.13% -0.31% 0.13% 0.33  %  -0.35% 0.48%
t-statistic   3.23
*** 2.76
*** 0.41 0.94  
z-statistic     1.55 -0.62     0.27 0.05
          
t – 2  37  36  2.99%  4.78% 2.71% 4.72% -2.14% -1.16 %  -2.70% -1.50%
t + 2  37  36  5.44%  6.76% 4.03% 5.06% -2.61% -0.95 %  -3.39% -1.82%
Diff. ∆     2.44%  2.05% 1.32% 0.34% -0.47% 0.21  %  -0.69% -0.32%
t-statistic    4.86
*** 3.71
*** -1.15 0.43  
z-statistic      -2.20
** -1.33    1.00 0.50
          
t – 3  23  23  2.16%  4.25 % 1.96% 4.85% -1.79% -1.06 %  -2.53% -0.82%
t + 3  23  23  4.43%  6.06 % 3.93% 5.02% -3.25% -1.50 %  -4.35% -1.94%
Diff. ∆     2.27%  1.81 % 1.97% 0.17% -1.46% -0.44  %  -1.82% -1.12%
t-statistic    5.53
*** 3.24
*** -3.88
*** -0.92  
z-statistic         -2.95
*** -1.12    1.66 1.44
Panel B: HGB to US-GAAP 
t – 1  21  21  5.79 %  6.65 % 5.49 % 6.76 % -0.79% -0.05 %  -1.34% 0.13%
t + 1  21  21  6.57 %  7.65 % 6.07 % 6.60 % -1.44% -0.06 %  -1.59% -1.12%
Diff. ∆     0.78  %  0.49 % 0.58 % -0.16 % -0.65% -0.60  %  -0.25% -1.25%
t-statistic    0.88    0.42 -0.76 -0.53   
z-statistic        1.77
* 1.00    -0.06 -0.37
            
t – 2  21  21  5.01 %  5.86 % 5.08 % 5.97 % -0.92% -0.48 %  -0.99% -0.35%
t + 2  21  21  6.67 %  7.84 % 7.06 % 7.85 % -2.39% -0.64 %  -2.14% -0.45%
Diff. ∆     1.66  %  1.99 % 1.98 % 1.88 % -1.47% -0.16  %  -1.15% -0.10%
t-statistic    2.32 
** 2.14
** -2.19
** -0.19  
z-statistic        2.54
** 2.02
**    -0.85 -0.23
            
t – 3  17  17  3.12 %  4.82 % 2.10 % 5.13 % -1.59% -0.88 %  -0.76% -0.75%
t + 3Diff. ∆ 17  17  6.80  %  7.53 % 7.29 % 6.81 % -2.30% -1.01  %  -2.39% -0.65%
     3.68  %  2.71 % 5.19 % 1.68 % -0.71% -0.13  %  -1.63% 0.10%
t-statistic    5.06 
*** 3.38
*** -0.95 -0.18  
z-statistic        2.91
*** 1.67
*    -1.62 -1.05
***, 
**, 
* Significantly different from zero at significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. A t-test of paired differences 
rejects the hypothesis of no difference from zero (two-tailed). A Wilcoxon rank sum test rejects the hypothesis of no 
difference in the distributions (two-tailed). The results are for a sample of German firms from 1993-2002 which 
switched their reporting standards from local GAAP (HGB) to IAS/IFRS (Panel A) or US-GAAP (Panel B). Data is 
from I/B/E/S, Datastream and Worldscope. Information on the accounting standards applied comes from the auditor’s 
statement of the annual reports. rpRIV is the risk premium estimated under the residual income valuation model, rpOJN is 
the risk premium estimated under the Ohlson/Jüttner-Nauroth (2001) model. To calculate the relative risk premium 
rrpRIV (rpOJN), the average risk premium of all sample firms at each estimation month is deducted as proxy for the 
market risk premium from each firm’s risk premium estimate rpRIV (rpOJN). The period t+/-1 (+/-2, 3) marks plus/minus 
one (two, three) years from the month of the first published annual financial report according to IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP 
standards. 
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TABLE 9 
Simultaneous Estimation of Expected Cost of Equity Capital and Long-Term Growth Rates for Switch-Firms 
 
            Panel A: Switch Sample (n=54) 
   RIV (ETSS 2002)    OJN (Easton 2004) 
  Local GAAP (Pre)    International GAAP (Post)    Local GAAP (Pre)    International GAAP (Post) 
Regression Coefficents  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept       
     















  1.1430 15.83
*** 




         
         
52.54%
 
47.85% 90.30%   83.92% 
Cost of equity capital (r)  9.57%    11.84%    9.51%    19.20% 
Long-term growth rate (g, ∆agr)            6.45% 8.66%   -0.10%       14.30% 
 
Panel B: Bootstrapped Switch Sample (n=54, 1000 iterations)           
   RIV (ETSS 2002) 
  Cost of equity capital (rRIV)        Long-term  Growth (g)
r pre rpost t-stats Z-stats   gpre gpost t-stats Z-stats  
Mean           
             
                    
 
9.55% 11.80% 54.96
***    6.44% 8.66% 35.51
*** 
Median 9.51% 11.72%     36.63
*** 6.42% 8.53%   28.64
*** 
Std. 0.77%     1.04%   1.28% 1.52%    
Interquartile Range  1.07%  1.40%      1.84%  2.02%     
Range 4.81%  5.96%      8.07%  8.78%     
   OJN (Easton 2004) 
  Cost of equity capital (rOJN)      Long-term  Growth (∆agr) 
r pre rpost t-stats Z-stats   ∆agr pre ∆agr post t-stats Z-stats  
Mean           
             
                    
 
9.80% 20.70% 50.37
***    0.12% 14.76% 36.63
*** 
Median 9.60% 19.34%     37.66
*** 0.12% 14.42%   29.15
*** 
Std. 1.33%     6.71%   4.80% 11.69%    
Interquartile Range  1.63%  8.86%      6.35%  16.19%     
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Panel C: Bootstrapped Industrial Switch Sample; (n=39, 1000 iterations) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
RIV  OJN RIV   OJN RIV  OJN RIV  OJN RIV   OJN
nHGB                               26 26 27 27 25 25 13 13 7 7
nInt.    8   8        11   11     18 18    26   26      29   29    
rHGB                       9.22% 11.57%    10.75% 12.75% 9.28% 12.41% 11.88% 41.49%    12.54% 11.65%
rInt.                     
             
                           
  10.61% 8.43%   7.86% 17.82% 12.58% 11.64% 15.19% 17.43%   13.23%  22.92%











g(∆agr)HGB 6.42% 2.52% 7.26% 7.26% 6.58% 3.64% 9.38% 42.03% 5.35% -0.45%
g(∆agr)Int.                          
                












                 
                                 
***, **, * Significantly different from zero at significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. A t-test as in Efron/Tibshirani (1993), p. 224 rejects the hypothesis of no difference from zero 
(two-tailed p-value) and A Wilcoxon rank sum test rejects the hypothesis of no difference in the distributions (two-tailed p-value). Results are based on a sample of 54 German 
firms which switch from local (HGB) to international reporting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) between 1993-2002 utilizing data from I/B/E/S, Datastream, Worldscope, and 
the annual reports. The sample firms are also the basis for the bootstrapped sample (1000 iterations) in Panel B. In panel C, only industrial firms (SIC codes 20-39) which 
switched enter the analysis. rRIV are the expected cost of equity capital estimated simultaneously with the long-term growth rate of earnings (g) under the residual income 
valuation model (RIV) as in Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis (ETSS 2002). rOJN are the expected cost of equity capital estimated simultaneously with long-term change in 
abnormal growth in earnings (∆agr) under the Ohlson/Jüttner-Nauroth (2001) model (OJN) as in Easton (2004). 
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FIGURE 1 
Distribution of Expected Cost of Equity Capital and Long-Term Growth Rates using Bootstrapping for the Switch Companies 
RIV (ETSS 2002) 
Cost of equity capital (rRIV)  Long-term growth rate (g) 


























































































































































































































































































































































































   66  
FIGURE 1 (cont.) 
Distribution of Expected Cost of Equity Capital and Long-Term Growth Rates using Bootstrapping for the Switch Companies 
OJN (Easton 2004) 
Cost of equity capital (rOJN)  Long-term growth rate (∆agr) 
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This figure displays the distributions expected cost of equity capital and long-term growth rates of earnings estimated simultaneously in a regression framework using 1000 
randomly drawn samples under bootstrapping initially 54 observations. These are from 54 German firms which switch between 1993-2002 from local (HGB) to international 
reporting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP). Data is from I/B/E/S,  Datastream,  Worldscope, and the annual reports. Pre-switch marks the time before the adoption of 
international standards, post-switch the time after the adoption of international standards. rRIV are the expected cost of equity capital estimated simultaneously with the long-term 
growth rate of earnings (g) under the residual income valuation model (RIV) as in Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis (ETSS 2002). rOJN are the expected cost of equity capital 
estimated simultaneously with long-term change in abnormal growth in earnings (∆agr) under the Ohlson/Jüttner-Nauroth (2001) model (OJN) as in Easton (2004). 
 
     
Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting 
 
No.133:  Christian Laux/ Volker Laux, Performance Measurement and Information 
Production, October 2004 
No.132:  André Güttler, Using a Bootstrap Approach to Rate the Raters, October 2004 
No.131:  Holger Daske, Economic Benefits of Adopting IFRS or US-GAAP – Have The 
Expected Costs of Equity Capital really decreased?, October 2004 
No.130:  Holger Daske/ Günther Gebhardt, Zukunftsorientierte Bestimmung von 
Kapitalkosten für die Unternehmensbewertung, September 2004 
No.129:  Andreas Gintschel/ Andreas Hackethal, Multi-Bank Loan Pool Contracts, 
June 2004 
No.128:  Andreas Hackethal/ Alexandre Zdantchouk, Share Buy-Backs in Germany – 
Overreaction to Weak Signals?, April 2004 
No.127:  Louis John Velthuis, Value Based Management auf Basis von ERIC, March 
2004 
No.126:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/ J.D. Von Pischke, Networks of Micro and Small 
Enterprise Banks: A Contribution to Financial Sector Development, January 
2004 
No.125:  Andreas Hackethal/ Reinhard H. Schmidt, Financing Patterns: Measurement 
Concepts and Empirical Results, January 2004 (fully revised version of Working 
Paper No. 33) 
No.124:  Holger Daske/ Günther Gebhardt/ Stefan Klein, Estimating the Expected 
Cost of Equity Capital Using Consensus Forecasts, January 2004 
No.123:  Peter Raupach, The Cost of Employee Stock Options, November 2004 
No.122:  Peter Raupach, The Valuation of Employee Stock Options - How Good is the 
Standard?, December 2003 
No.121:  Andreas Jobst, European Securitisation: A GARCH Model of CDO, MBS and 
Pfandbrief Spreads, November 2003 
No.120:  Baris Serifsoy/ Marco Weiss, Efficient Systems for the Securities Transaction 
Industry- A Framework for the European Union, November 2003 
No.119:  Andreas Jobst, Verbriefung und ihre Auswirkung auf die Finanzmarktstabilität, 
October 2003 
No.118:  Reinhard H. Schmidt, Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic 
Perspective, August 2003 (erschienen in: “The German Financial System”, 
Krahnen, J.P. und Schmidt, R.H. (Hrsg.), Kapitel 12, Oxford University Press, 
London (2004)) 
No.117:  Volker Laux, The Ignored Performance Measure, October 2003 
 



















































































  http://www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de 
Kontaktadresse für Bestellungen: 
 
Professor Dr. Reinhard H. Schmidt 
Wilhelm Merton Professur für  
Internationales Bank- und Finanzwesen 
Mertonstr. 17 









Mit freundlicher Unterstützung der Unternehmen der  Sparkassen-
Finanzgruppe Hessen-Thüringen. 